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FINDING THE LOST INVOLUNTARY PUBLIC FIGURE 
 
Jeffrey Omar Usman∗ 
 
Though their quarry is shrouded in mystery,1 and indeed sometimes thought 
to be only a creature of myth or legend,2 a number of judges, both those acting 
alone3 and those concentrated in groups,4 claim to have seen an involuntary public 
figure cross their paths. Descriptions have been offered, and those descriptions 
have been dutifully reported.5 It is not clear though that the judges saw either the 
same thing or the same thing from the same angle.6  
∗ © 2014 Jeffrey Omar Usman. Assistant Professor of Law, Belmont University 
School of Law. L.L.M., Harvard Law School; J.D., Vanderbilt University Law School; 
B.A., Georgetown University. I offer my appreciation to Christine Davis, Brett Knight, and 
Nate Lykins for their excellent assistance and for the able and skillful editorial aide 
provided by the members of the Utah Law Review most especially Mark Capone, Larissa 
Lee, and Christopher Mitchell. My thanks as always to Elizabeth Usman and Emmett 
Usman. 
1 See Susan M. Gilles, From Baseball Parks to the Public Arena: Assumption of the 
Risk in Tort Law and Constitutional Libel Law, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 231, 270 (2002) 
(recognizing “the confusion surrounding that near-mythical plaintiff, the ‘involuntary 
public figure’”); 3 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
§ 23:4, at 23-69 (2014) (stating the U.S. Supreme Court’s reference in Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc. to involuntary public figures “has generated much confusion”); J. Wilson 
Parker, Free Expression and the Function of the Jury, 65 B.U. L. REV. 483, 546 n.314 
(1985) (“The Court’s confusion in Gertz became evident in its attempted application of the 
Gertz rule to other involuntary public figures.”); Nat Stern, Unresolved Antitheses of the 
Limited Public Figure Doctrine, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1027, 1096 (1996) (indicating that “the 
potency of the involuntary public figure doctrine remain[s] uncertain”); see also Rosanova 
v. Playboy Enters., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (observing that “[d]efining 
public figures is much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall”). 
2 See Schultz v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 468 F. Supp. 551, 559 (E.D. Mich. 1979) 
(indicating that the continuing vitality of the involuntary public figure has been called into 
question); LYRISSA BARNETT LIDSKY & R. GEORGE WRIGHT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: A 
REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 81 (2004) (noting that “the 
lower courts have split on how to define involuntary public figures and, indeed, whether 
the category even continues to exist”); 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 2:33 
(2d ed. 2014) (expressing skepticism about the existence of involuntary public figures). 
3 See, e.g., Zupnik v. Associated Press, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 70, 73 (D. Conn. 1998); 
Foretich v. Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1099, 1108 (D.D.C. 1991); 
Price v. Chi. Magazine, No. 86 C 8161, 1988 WL 61170, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. June 1, 1988). 
4 See, e.g., Dameron v. Wash. Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736, 740–42 (D.C. Cir. 1985); 
Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175, 186 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Daniel 
Goldreyer, Ltd. v. Dow Jones & Co., 687 N.Y.S.2d 64, 64 (App. Div. 1999); Wilson v. 
Daily Gazette Co., 588 S.E.2d 197, 208–09 (W. Va. 2003). 
5 See, e.g., Dameron, 779 F.2d at 742 (indicating that an otherwise private individual 
became an involuntary public figure by “assum[ing] special prominence in the resolution of 
[a] public question” by “bec[oming] embroiled, through no desire of his own, in [a public] 
951 
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Standing at the intersection between defamation claims and the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court 
has sought to balance the interests of the states in providing redress for the harm 
caused by defamation injuries arising from media coverage with the need for a 
robust and vigorous press. In structuring a constitutional framework for 
adjudication of defamation actions, the Supreme Court cryptically and fleetingly 
referenced a category of plaintiffs—involuntary public figures. Trying to 
understand and define the contours of the involuntary public figure category, or 
indeed to ascertain if it even exists, has been a source of tremendous confusion and 
uncertainty. The involuntary public figure has become lost. This Article seeks to 
find the lost involuntary public figure.  
In seeking to do so, this Article follows Aristotle’s guidance that “[i]f you 
would understand anything, observe its beginning and its development.”7 That is 
controversy . . . [and] thereby became well known to the public in this one very limited 
connection”) (second alteration in original) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 351 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Marcone v. Penthouse Int’l Magazine 
For Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1084 n.9 (3d Cir. 1985) (suggesting that the only persons who 
would qualify as involuntary public figures are “relatives of famous people”); Wells v. 
Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 540 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[A]n involuntary public figure has pursued a 
course of conduct from which it was reasonably foreseeable, at the time of the conduct, that 
public interest would arise. A public controversy must have actually arisen that is related 
to, although not necessarily causally linked, to the action. The involuntary public figure 
must be recognized as a central figure during debate over that matter. Further, we retain 
two elements of the five-part Reuber test, specifically: (1) the controversy existed prior to 
the publication of the defamatory statement; and (2) the plaintiff retained public-figure 
status at the time of the alleged defamation. Additionally, to the extent that an involuntary 
public figure attempts self-help, the Foretich rule must apply with equal strength.” (citation 
omitted)); Wilson, 588 S.E.2d at 208–09 (“[T]o prove that a plaintiff is an involuntary 
public figure, the defendant must demonstrate by clear evidence that (1) the plaintiff has 
become a central figure in a significant public controversy, (2) that the allegedly 
defamatory statement has arisen in the course of discourse regarding the public matter, and 
(3) the plaintiff has taken some action, or failed to act when action was required, in 
circumstances in which a reasonable person would understand that publicity would likely 
inhere.”). 
6 See VINCENT R. JOHNSON, ADVANCED TORT LAW: A PROBLEM APPROACH 220 
(2010) (noting that “[c]ourts have employed such a bewildering array of tests in grappling 
with the elusive idea of ‘involuntary public figure’ status that it is difficult to say anything 
about this category”); Joseph H. King, Jr., Deus ex Machina and the Unfulfilled Promise of 
New York Times v. Sullivan: Applying the Times for All Seasons, 95 KY. L.J. 649, 672 
(2006–2007) (noting the “dizzying variety of approaches” “to the involuntary public figure 
subcategory [that] have been adopted by the courts”). 
7 Stephanie M. Reich et al., An Introduction to the Diversity of Community 
Psychology Internationally, in INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY: HISTORY AND 
THEORIES 1, 5 (Stephanie M. Reich et al. eds., 2007). While differing with Aristotle with 
regard to the value of philosophy, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes concurred with Aristotle 
in terms of valuing history: “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.” New York Trust 
Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). This wisdom is also reflected in the modern adage 
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precisely how the discussion in this Article begins in Part I, through observation of 
the beginning and development of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the 
constitutional limitations imposed upon defamation actions under the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Part II of the Article then briefly 
sets forth the constitutional framework that the Supreme Court imposed in 1974 on 
defamation actions in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.8 The Article then addresses in 
Part III how the pressures of the First Amendment have eroded the structure that 
Gertz built. In doing so, Part III specifically explores the expanding definition of 
who constitutes a public official and what qualifies as a matter of public 
controversy, the weakening of the underlying rationales for Gertz’s distinguishing 
between public and private figures both in terms of access to channels of 
communication and the definition of voluntariness, and the increasing force of 
Justice William Brennan’s contention in Gertz, advanced in his dissenting opinion, 
that there is no such thing as a private person. Part IV seeks to demonstrate that, 
while First Amendment pressures have weakened the edifice created by the Gertz 
structure, there is continuing value and purpose to the Gertz framework. Having 
developed an understanding of the Gertz structure as it exists today, the 
constitutional pressures thereupon, and continuing value thereof, Part V defines the 
involuntary public figure. Part V also reflects the manner in which this 
understanding of who qualifies as an involuntary public figure relieves some of the 
First Amendment pressures on other categories within the Gertz framework, while 
still serving the enduring purposes of Gertz’s distinguishing public from private 
persons. Most notably the Article addresses how the disuse of the involuntary 
public figure category has resulted in distortion of the concept of voluntariness, 
which plays a critical role in classification of an individual as a public figure or 
private individual.  
 
I.  THE ROAD FROM NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. SULLIVAN TO GERTZ V. ROBERT 
WELCH, INC. 
 
While there are certainly other significant decisions,9 there are four cases, 
each decided three to four years apart over the course of the decade between 1964 
to 1974, that form the core of the Supreme Court’s exploration of the constitutional 
constraints upon defamation actions: (1) New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,10 (2) 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,11 (3) Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,12 and (4) 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.  
that “[y]ou can’t know where you’re going unless you know where you’ve been.” THE 
DICTIONARY OF MODERN PROVERBS 134 (Charles Clay Doyle et al. eds., 2012). 
8 418 U.S. 323 (1974).  
9 See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); 
Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 
111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 
10 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
11 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
12 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
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A.  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 
 
On March 29, 1960, the New York Times published a page-length editorial 
advertisement, which had been created by civil rights leaders A. Philip Randolph 
and Bayard Rustin,13 entitled Heed Their Rising Voices.14 The advertisement, 
which listed eighty prominent endorsers,15 was a successful appeal to raise money 
to assist Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. with legal fees incurred during the civil rights 
struggle.16 The advertisement’s focus on misconduct of police officials and the 
reasonable non-violent resistance of civil rights protestors was in accord with the 
broader civil rights movement strategy of appealing to people’s consciences, 
especially in the North, by shining a light on the extreme racism then existent in 
the South.17  
Iconoclastic Alabama journalist Ray Jenkins,18 who was one of a small 
number of regular readers of the New York Times in Montgomery,19 thought a 
story on the advertisement would provide insight for his readers into law 
enforcement’s treatment of civil rights protestors.20 In Jenkins’ Alabama Journal 
story, which was published approximately a week after the advertisement in the 
13 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 304 (2000). 
14 KENNETH C. CREECH, ELECTRONIC MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 331 (5th ed. 
2007). 
15 The list of signatories and endorsers of the advertisement included ministers, 
musicians, athletes, and a wide variety of other well-known persons including former First 
Lady Eleanor Roosevelt. Heed Their Rising Voices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1960, at 25. 
16 POWE, supra note 13, at 304–05. 
17 Anthony Lewis, The Press: Free but Not Exceptional, in REASON AND PASSION: 
JUSTICE BRENNAN’S ENDURING INFLUENCE 53, 54 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard 
Schwartz eds., 1997); Anthony Lewis, The Sullivan Decision, 1 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 135, 
136–37 (2004). See generally Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil 
Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 141–49 (1994) (explaining how civil rights leaders in 
the early 1960s directed their efforts to enlisting northern whites to the civil rights cause). 
“[C]ivil rights leaders made a virtue out of the necessity of raising money to defend King,” 
and they accomplished this by “bring[ing] attention to King’s plight through a full-page 
ad . . . that would also call attention to the sit-in movement generally and events in 
Montgomery specifically.” KERMIT L. HALL & MELVIN I. UROFSKY, NEW YORK TIMES V. 
SULLIVAN: CIVIL RIGHTS, LIBEL LAW, AND THE FREE PRESS 15–16 (2011). 
18 Jenkins proved to be a source of irritation over the years to Alabama’s political 
establishment. See generally RICK PERLSTEIN, NIXONLAND: THE RISE OF A PRESIDENT AND 
THE FRACTURING OF AMERICA 79 (2008) (describing Jenkins’s role in Alabama’s politics). 
19 ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 9 (1991). At the time of the article’s publication, there were only 394 issues 
of the New York Times that were printed for individual subscribers or newsstands in the 
entire State of Alabama. Id.; KERMIT L. HALL & JOHN J. PATRICK, THE PURSUIT OF 
JUSTICE: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS THAT SHAPED AMERICA 143 (2006).  
20 See HALL & PATRICK, supra note 19, at 143. Jenkins also appreciated the interest 
that a story involving Dr. King, who was both revered and hated in Montgomery, would 
generate, as well as the interest attached to learning about the prominent signatories and 
endorsers. HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 17, at 23.  
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New York Times, he noted that a number of factual errors appeared in the 
advertisement, but that the errors were minor in nature.21 These minor errors would 
prove extremely problematic for the New York Times and the four Alabama 
ministers listed as endorsers of the advertisement: Reverends Ralph Abernathy, 
Joseph Lowery, S.S. Seay, Sr., and Fred Shuttlesworth.22 
Responding to Jenkins’ story, Montgomery Advertiser editor Grover Hall, Jr. 
brought his editorial page to a full pitch fury against the New York Times.23 The 
advertisement had struck a particularly sensitive cord with Hall, whose southern 
pride and irritation at what he perceived as hypocritical blindness of the press 
toward racial tensions in northern cities were pronounced.24 In his bombastic 
editorial entitled Lies, Lies, Lies, Hall roared, 
 
[t]here are voluntary liars, there are involuntary liars. Both kinds of liars 
contributed to the crude slanders against Montgomery . . . in a full-page 
advertisement in the New York Times . . . . Lies, lies, lies . . . and 
possibly willful ones on the part of the fund-raising novelist who wrote 
those lines to prey on the credulity, self-righteousness and 
misinformation of northern citizens.25  
 
Taking offense against the advertisement on behalf of the entire State of Alabama, 
Hall “invited everyone in Alabama to sue the New York Times.”26  
Montgomery Police Commissioner L.B. Sullivan did not need 
encouragement. He believed the advertisement maligned him personally and the 
Montgomery police officers he supervised.27 The entire Alabama political 
establishment from the Governor downward also bristled at criticism from northern 
newspapers at their handling of civil rights protestors and had been looking for an 
opportunity to strike at the northern press.28 The Attorney General of Alabama 
advised that the “proper public officials” should file multimillion-dollar lawsuits 
against the New York Times.29 Sullivan, who was already irked by the press, even 
local media such as Hall,30 struck back.31  
21 SUSAN DUDLEY GOLD, NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. SULLIVAN: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 
OR LIBEL? 19 (2007). 
22 See FRED D. GRAY, BUS RIDE TO JUSTICE: CHANGING THE SYSTEM BY THE SYSTEM 
156–59 (rev. ed. 2013). 
23 LEWIS, supra note 19, at 10–11.  
24 Id. at 11.  
25 Id.  
26 GOLD, supra note 21, at 19. 
27 Id. at 19–21. 
28 Id. at 22–24. 
29 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF 
THE PRESS IN AMERICA 82 (1991). 
30 Sullivan was regularly engaged in struggles with the press and even Hall was too 
progressive for Sullivan’s tastes. As an illustration, in 1960 a group of students from 
Alabama State College demanded to be seated and served in a state cafeteria that was open 
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Sullivan brought suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Alabama 
against the New York Times Company and the four Alabama ministers who had 
been endorsers.32 Alabama state courts, through both judges and juries, had long 
been complicit in the maintenance of white supremacy within the State of 
Alabama.33 It was to those state courts that the Alabama political establishment 
turned to take action against their political adversaries.34 The New York Times was 
easily perceived by white Alabamians of the era as among the “outside agitators” 
against whom their animus was directed.35 
The inclusion of the Alabama ministers tactically eliminated diversity 
jurisdiction as a route for removing the case to federal court, but their inclusion 
was not merely tactical.36 The ministers were also a target of the white political 
establishment.37 Having been locked in a social, political, and legal struggle with 
Alabama’s white supremacy power structure, Reverends Abernathy, Lowery, Seay, 
to the public. STEPHAN LESHER, GEORGE WALLACE: AMERICAN POPULIST 145–46 (1994). 
On the basis of their race, the students were denied seating; they left peaceably. Id. 
Nevertheless, Governor John Patterson demanded College President H. Council Trenholm 
expel the students and threatened the loss of state funding for failure to do so. Id. Trenholm 
acceded to the demands. Id. at 146. Rumors of sit-ins to protest the Governor’s demand and 
Trenholm’s acquiescence spread throughout Montgomery. Id. While the rumored sit-ins 
did not materialize, violent white supremacists assaulted African Americans in 
Montgomery in response to the rumors. Id. In a particularly disturbing incident, an African 
American woman was beaten severely with a baseball bat. Id. A photograph of the attacker, 
who was identified in the newspaper, was published in the Montgomery Advertiser. Id. The 
story therein indicated that the police had witnessed the attack and done nothing. Id. 
Sullivan insisted the attacker, despite the Montgomery Advertiser story, could not be 
identified from the photograph and denounced the Alabama State College students for 
creating tensions and the newspaper for publishing the photograph. Id. Hall indicated that 
Sullivan’s problem is “‘not a photographer with a camera’ but a ‘white man with a baseball 
bat.’” Id.  
31 HALL & PATRICK, supra note 19, at 143. 
32 LEWIS, supra note 19, at 12. 
33 See generally Robert J. Norrell, Law in a White Man’s Democracy: A History of the 
Alabama State Judiciary, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 135 (2001) (exploring the long and troubling 
history of the Alabama judiciary’s involvement in maintaining white supremacy); HASAN 
KWAME JEFFRIES, BLOODY LOWNDES: CIVIL RIGHTS AND BLACK POWER IN ALABAMA’S 
BLACK BELT 133 (2009) (addressing racial prejudice in Alabama’s juries); Michael J. 
Klarman, Is the Supreme Court Sometimes Irrelevant? Race and the Southern Criminal 
Justice System in the 1940s, 89 J. AM. HIST. 119 (2002) (discussing the minimal effects of 
Supreme Court rulings on civil rights as result, in part, of resistance from Southern judges 
and juries). 
34 JAMES L. AUCOIN, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM 68 
(2005); Garrett Epps, The Other Sullivan Case, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 783, 784–85 
(2005). 
35 JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 429 
(2006). 
36 See Epps, supra note 34, at 784–86. 
37 Id.  
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and Shuttlesworth were perceived as in-state agitators.38 Sullivan sought $500,000 
in damages from each of the defendants.39 This was not the first time Alabama’s 
political apparatus had made active use of the legal system to attack the civil rights 
movement.40 As a practical matter, legal costs had proven to be a persistent 
underlying problem for the movement and now Sullivan was seeking a judgment 
that would be impossible to pay.41 The defamation suit was an opportunity to 
deliver a crushing blow.  
In terms of the legal theory and facts underlying his defamation action, 
Sullivan specifically raised objections to assertions advanced in the third and sixth 
paragraphs of the advertisement,42 which said, 
 
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang “My Country, ’Tis of 
Thee” on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from school, 
and truck-loads of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the 
Alabama State College Campus. When the entire student body protested 
to state authorities by refusing to re-register, their dining hall was pad-
locked in an attempt to starve them into submission. . . .  
 Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King’s 
peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his 
home almost killing his wife and child. They have assaulted his person. 
They have arrested him seven times—for “speeding,” “loitering” and 
similar “offenses.” And now they have charged him with “perjury” . . . 
under which they could imprison him for ten years. Obviously, their real 
purpose is to remove him physically as the leader to whom the students 
and millions of others—look for guidance and support, and thereby to 
intimidate all leaders who may rise in the South. Their strategy is to 
behead this affirmative movement, and thus to demoralize [African] 
Americans and weaken their will to struggle. The defense of Martin 
Luther King, spiritual leader of the student sit-in movement, clearly, 
therefore, is an integral part of the total struggle for freedom in the 
South.43 
 
As Jenkins’s had noted in his Alabama Journal story, the advertisement was 
less than a work of precision.44 Among the errors therein, the campus dining hall 
had not been padlocked on any occasion, the police had a significant presence near 
the campus but did not “ring” the campus and had not been called to the campus in 
response to the demonstration at the capitol steps, the students had sung a different 
38 See id. 
39 HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 17, at 31–32.  
40 Id. at 15. 
41 PETER E. KANE, ERRORS, LIES, AND LIBEL 10 (1992). 
42 LEWIS, supra note 19, at 12.  
43 Heed Their Rising Voices, supra note 15. 
44 GOLD, supra note 21, at 18–19. 
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song,45 and the police had arrested Dr. King four not seven times.46 Precious little 
attention was given to the connection between the advertisement’s content and 
Sullivan or to the advertisement having injured his reputation.47 Furthermore, the 
ministers testified without contradiction that they had not seen the advertisement 
much less authorized use of their names as endorsers.48 In fact, the ministers only 
discovered their names were listed on the advertisement, their names having been 
added to the advertisement as endorsers without the ministers’ knowledge or 
consent,49 through Sullivan’s filing of suit against them.50 Nevertheless, the all-
white Montgomery jury lashed out at the ministers and the New York Times, 
returning $500,000 verdicts against each of the defendants.51 Moving forward with 
enforcement of the decision, Sullivan and the Alabama judiciary would prove 
particularly vindictive towards the ministers, seizing and levying their property for 
payment of the judgment without following standard procedures in awaiting 
resolution of the case on appeal.52  
The jury’s decision shone a path for southern officials to bring the northern 
press to heel. In the eighteen months that immediately followed the verdict, 
southern political officials would file defamation actions seeking more than three 
hundred million dollars in damages related to news coverage of the civil rights 
movement.53 The lawsuits targeted journalists who were reporting upon the civil 
rights movement.54 While New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan was pending before the 
Supreme Court, the New York Times Company “pulled its reporters out of 
Alabama, achieving precisely what the state had hoped—an end to national 
attention to its racial policies, at least in the pages of the Times.”55 That the 
defamation lawsuits were curtailing reporting by the press on the civil rights 
movement in the South was far from a hidden consequence.56 A headline in the 
Montgomery Advertiser boldly celebrated “State Finds Formidable Legal Club to 
45 The advertisement indicated the students were singing My Country ‘Tis of Thee. Id. 
at 18. The students were actually singing The Star-Spangled Banner. Id. 
46 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 259 (1964). 
47 Reflecting on the case, Justice Hugo Black of Alabama quipped “that if any of 
Sullivan’s friends in Montgomery believed he had ordered the repression of the civil rights 
movement described in the New York Times advertisement, his ‘political, social and 
financial prestige has likely been enhanced.’” LEWIS, supra note 19, at 225. 
48 Id. at 12.  
49 HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 17, at 15–18 (discussing how the four ministers’ 
names came to be included in the advertisement without their knowledge or consent). 
50 TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954–63, 
at 289 (1988). 
51 HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 17, at 31–33, 68. 
52 Id. at 88; ALFRED H. KNIGHT, THE LIFE OF THE LAW: THE PEOPLE AND CASES THAT 
HAVE SHAPED OUR SOCIETY, FROM KING ALFRED TO RODNEY KING 228 (1996); Epps, 
supra note 34, at 785. 
53 KNIGHT, supra note 52, at 229. 
54 AUCOIN, supra note 34, at 68. 
55 NEWTON, supra note 35, at 429. 
56 KNIGHT, supra note 52, at 229. 
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Swing at Out-of-State Press.”57 The Alabama Journal observed that as a result of 
the verdict its northern press counterparts might “re-survey . . . their habit of 
permitting anything detrimental to the south and its people to appear in their 
columns.”58 In their brief before the Supreme Court, the ministers perfectly 
described the use of libel suits as a political tool in support of white supremacy. 
Such suits are “part of a concerted, calculated program to carry out a policy of 
punishing, intimidating and silencing all who criticize and seek to change 
Alabama’s notorious political system of enforced segregation.”59 
While in retrospect the unconstitutionality of Alabama’s strict liability 
approach to defamation is clear,60 it was far from that at the time.61 On appeal, the 
Alabama Supreme Court did not provide any succor to the New York Times.62 To 
the contrary, the Court noted that the crux of the lawsuit involved libelous portions 
of the advertisement and that “[t]he First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does 
not protect libelous publications.”63 The Alabama Supreme Court, not surprisingly, 
cited, among others cases, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire.64 Therein, the Court had indicated that 
 
[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, 
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise 
57 Id. 
58 DOUGLAS M. FRALEIGH & JOSEPH S. TUMAN, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE 
MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 172 (2011). 
59 Brief for Petitioners at 29, Abernathy v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1963) (No. 40), 
1963 WL 105893, at *29. 
60 Judge Alex Kozinski has presented a rendering of the stark consequences of a 
different conclusion: 
 
If successful, the lawsuits would effectively ring down the curtain on conditions 
of blacks in the South, for every story and every advertisement commenting on 
those conditions would expose the media sources to liability. Worse, if L. B. 
Sullivan—a small-town official from the heart of Dixie—could intimidate The 
New York Times, the media in this country would become as effective as a 
toothless guard dog. 
 
Alex Kozinski, The Bulwark Brennan Built, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov./Dec. 1991, at 
85, 85. Professor Norman Rosenberg has noted that the libel suits “seemed about to inhibit 
political discussion even more seriously than had the infamous Sedition Act of 1798.” 
NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE LAW OF LIBEL 236 (1986). 
61 See KNIGHT, supra note 52, at 229–30.  
62 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25 (Ala. 1962). 
63 Id. at 40. 
64 Id. (citing Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Times Film Corp. v. 
City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 
U.S. 697 (1931)). 
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any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the 
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or “fighting” words—those which 
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach 
of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.65 
 
Nor did this decision reflect a new approach to the intersection of a free press 
with libel. To the contrary, William Blackstone’s Commentaries had provided that 
“where blasphemous, immoral, treasonable, schismatical, seditious, or scandalous 
libels are punished by the English law . . . the liberty of the press, properly 
understood, is by no means infringed or violated.”66 Though the legal revolution 
that the Warren Court was generating should have perhaps provided him with 
pause,67 Sullivan’s attorney, M. Roland Nachman, Jr.,68 was understandably 
confident of his chances of prevailing before the high court. He said, “[t]he only 
way the Court could decide against me was to change one hundred years or more 
of libel law.”69  
That is precisely what the U.S. Supreme Court would do. For the Court, the 
advertisement being libelous under state tort law was not controlling; rather, the 
Court glided past the heart of Sullivan’s argument, concluding that “libel can claim 
no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations.”70 Distinguishing prior 
precedents that suggested the opposite, the Court noted those prior cases did not 
involve application of libel suits “to impose sanctions upon expression critical of 
the official conduct of public officials.”71 The Court rejected the foundation of 
Sullivan’s argument that libelous speech was not subject to constitutional scrutiny 
and concluded instead that defamation actions would have to be “measured by 
standards that satisfy the First Amendment.”72 
In weighing Alabama’s state defamation law against First Amendment 
standards, neither the inclusion of false information in the advertisement nor the 
65 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
66 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151 (emphasis omitted). 
67 See generally Jeffrey Omar Usman, Constitutional Constraints on Retroactive Civil 
Legislation: The Hollow Promises of the Federal Constitution and Unrealized Potential of 
State Constitutions, 14 NEV. L.J. 63, 80–81 (2013) (noting that the Warren Court 
fundamentally changed the legal landscape surrounding the United States Constitution 
through a “jurisprudential revolution” that “breathed [life] into the Federal Constitution” 
and “sucked [life] out of the state constitutions”). 
68 Nachman, a Montgomery attorney and a graduate of Harvard College and Harvard 
Law School, was one of the small numbers of Alabamians who subscribed to the New York 
Times. LEWIS, supra note 19, at 111. 
69 POWE, supra note 29, at 87. 
70 New York Times Co., v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964). 
71 Id. at 268. 
72 Id. at 269. 
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availability of truth as a defense was sufficient to render the verdict sustainable.73 
The Court concluded that requiring critics of public officials to guarantee the truth 
of all their statements under the looming threat of a libel judgment would dampen 
the vigor and limit the variety of public debate.74 In order to protect public 
discourse about the conduct of public officials, the Court determined that an error, 
even one resulting from negligence, should not be sufficient to recover tort 
damages.75 The Court recognized that “erroneous statement is inevitable in free 
debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 
‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive.’”76 Quoting John Stuart Mill, the 
Court observed that “[e]ven a false statement may be deemed to make a valuable 
contribution to public debate, since it brings about ‘the clearer perception and 
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.’”77 
To maintain the necessary breathing room for protecting public debate, the 
Court determined that a public official could not recover damages for a defamatory 
falsehood relating to his or her official conduct without proof that the statement 
was made with “actual malice.”78 To demonstrate actual malice, claimants would 
henceforth need to show the statement was made “with knowledge that it was false 
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”79  
The Court’s holding in New York Times was expressly tied to First 
Amendment limits on defamation actions brought by public officials80 regarding 
their official conduct, and the Court’s reasoning was intertwined with speech 
regarding governance.81 Nevertheless, expansion of this First Amendment 
protection seemed to be on the horizon. The Court’s declaration in New York Times 
that the constitutional safeguard of the First Amendment “was fashioned to assure 
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social 
changes desired by the people” pointed to constitutional protections relating to 
defamation actions involving persons other than public officials.82  
 
73 Id. at 268–69. 
74 Id. at 270–71, 279. 
75 See id. at 268–69. 
76 Id. at 271–72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
77 Id. at 279 n.19 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 (R.B. McCallum ed., 
Oxford, B. Blackwell 1946) (1859)). 
78 Id. at 279–80. 
79 Id. at 280. 
80 Having determined that Sullivan, as the Montgomery County Commissioner in 
charge of the police, clearly qualified as a public official, the Court did not find it necessary 
to further address who qualifies as a public official. Id. at 283 n.23. The Court provided 
additional insight in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). Therein, the Court 
indicated that “the ‘public official’ designation applies at the very least to those among the 
hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial 
responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.” Id. 
81 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 264, 268–78. 
82 Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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B.  Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts 
 
That extension of the actual malice standard beyond speech related to public 
officials occurred in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, which addresses two 
consolidated cases—one involving a former University of Georgia football coach 
and the other a retired Army General.83 As for the former, the tenure of James 
Wallace Butts, Jr., better known as Wally Butts, as the head football coach for the 
University of Georgia from 1939 to 1960 was so successful that it resulted in his 
posthumous enshrinement in the college football hall of fame.84 As 1960 
approached, however, Butts’s teams started to have too many losing seasons on the 
field,85 and Butts’s character defects were increasingly causing off the field image 
problems for the university.86 Though he was removed from the more visible 
position of head football coach, Butts retained his position as athletic director.87 At 
the time, the Georgia athletic director was paid using private funds and was a 
private employee under Georgia law rather than a state employee.88 Because the 
Supreme Court resolved the case on other grounds, it did not consider whether 
Butts was truly a private employee.89  
Butts was still the Georgia athletic director on September 13, 1962 when he 
telephonically crossed paths with Atlanta businessman George Burnett.90 While 
making a phone call, a telephone operator mistakenly connected Burnett into a 
phone conversation between Butts and Alabama football coach Paul “Bear” 
Bryant.91 Burnett claimed the conversation involved Butts revealing insider 
information to an appreciative Bryant that would be helpful for Alabama in their 
upcoming game against Georgia.92 The following weekend, Alabama annihilated 
83 388 U.S. 130, 135–42 (1967); see also Norman T. Deutsch, Professor Nimmer 
Meets Professor Schauer (and Others): An Analysis of “Definitional Balancing” as a 
Methodology for Determining the “Visible Boundaries of the First Amendment,” 39 
AKRON L. REV. 483, 525 (2006) (noting the Supreme Court’s expansion of the actual 
malice standard to public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts). 
84 See RICHARD SCOTT, SEC FOOTBALL: 75 YEARS OF PRIDE AND PASSION 126 
(2008); TONY BARNHART, ALWAYS A BULLDOG: PLAYERS, COACHES, AND FANS SHARE 
THEIR PASSION FOR GEORGIA FOOTBALL 137–38 (2011).  
85 VINCE J. DOOLEY & TONY BARNHART, DOOLEY: MY 40 YEARS AT GEORGIA 125 
(2005) (stating that five of Butts’s last eight seasons ended with losing records). 
86 RICHARD O. DAVIES & RICHARD G. ABRAM, BETTING THE LINE: SPORTS 
WAGERING IN AMERICAN LIFE 107–08 (2001); ALBERT J. FIGONE, CHEATING THE SPREAD: 
GAMBLERS, POINT SHAVERS, AND GAME FIXERS IN COLLEGE FOOTBALL AND BASKETBALL 
75 (2012) (indicating that boosters pressured to have Butts fired in large part because of his 
personal financial problems, excessive drinking at nightclubs, and sexual indiscretions with 
young women, including on out-of-town trips financed at the university’s expense). 
87 FIGONE, supra note 86, at 75. 
88 Curtis Publ’g Co., 388 U.S. at 135. 
89 See id. at 135 & n.2. 
90 FIGONE, supra note 86, at 75. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 76. 
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Georgia thirty-five to zero in the game—a margin of victory that was twice the 
betting line.93 Burnett, who had taken notes on the conversation, waited several 
months before talking with University of Georgia officials.94 When he finally did 
so, the University through the Georgia Attorney General’s Office conducted an 
investigation that found enough cause for concern to force Butts’s resignation in 
February of 1963.95  
Sportswriter Frank Graham, Jr. had gotten word from the Saturday Evening 
Post of a scandal involving Butts and was investigating the matter.96 The reason 
for the resignation had not yet broken in the press.97 Like Butts, by 1960 the 
Saturday Evening Post had seen better days.98 What once had been a publishing 
powerhouse aimed at Middle America and adorned with Norman Rockwell’s 
artistry had grown stale and was losing market position.99 To turn things around, 
Curtis Publishing hired an energetic editor-in-chief named Clay Blair, who planned 
to steer the magazine toward “sophisticated muck-racking” and “provoking 
people.”100 The Butts/Bryant story fit perfectly with the new direction of the 
magazine,101 so the magazine purchased Burnett’s cooperation for $5,000.102  
Fearing leaks from his own editors and concerned that a competitor might 
scoop the Butts/Bryant story, Blair created an ad hoc publishing process that 
lacked the magazine’s normal editorial oversight and review.103 The March 23, 
1963 edition of the Saturday Evening Post included the less-than-thoroughly 
vetted “The Story of a College Football Fix.”104 Within days of release of the 
issue, Butts and Bryant filed suits seeking millions of dollars in damages.105 
Relying upon diversity jurisdiction, Butts filed suit in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Georgia.106 Whatever the truth may be,107 the 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 77. 
95 Id. at 77–78. 
96 Id. at 78. 
97 FRANK GRAHAM, JR., A FAREWELL TO HEROES 284 (1981). 
98 KEITH DUNNAVANT, COACH: THE LIFE OF PAUL “BEAR” BRYANT 168 (rev. ed. 
2005). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 168–69. 
101 GRAHAM, supra note 97, at 284. 
102 FIGONE, supra note 86, at 77–78. 
103 DUNNAVANT, supra note 98, at 169–70. 
104 FIGONE, supra note 86, at 79. 
105 DUNNAVANT, supra note 98, at 170. 
106 FIGONE, supra note 86, at 82. 
107 James Kirby, who had been the Dean of the Ohio State University College of Law, 
General Counsel of New York University, and a Professor at the University of Tennessee 
College of Law, was hired as an observer of the trial by the Southeastern Conference. Id. at 
77. In a book he wrote on the scandal, Kirby concludes both Butts and Bryant acted with 
impropriety but that Alabama would have likely won and covered the betting line spread 
anyway. JAMES KIRBY, FUMBLE: BEAR BRYANT, WALLY BUTTS, AND THE GREAT COLLEGE 
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trial itself proved to be no less of a rout than Alabama’s victory over Georgia had 
been in the allegedly fixed game.108 The jury returned a $3.6 million verdict for 
Butts, which was reduced by the trial court to $460,000.109 Shortly thereafter, the 
Supreme Court released its New York Times Co. v. Sullivan decision, and the 
publisher filed a motion for new trial based thereupon.110 The district court denied 
the publisher’s motion because Butts was not a public official and because the jury 
could have concluded the publisher acted with reckless disregard as to whether the 
article was false or not.111 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed the judgment in a divided vote.112 
The companion case involved former Army General Edwin Walker and the 
Associated Press’s reporting on his role in riots at the University of Mississippi in 
opposition to enforcement of court ordered integration.113 Denied admission to the 
all-white University of Mississippi on the basis of race, James Meredith 
successfully challenged the University’s exclusionary policies in court.114 
Mississippi state officials, however, repeatedly refused to honor court orders 
requiring his admission.115 The Kennedy administration sought an accommodation 
with Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett but was unable to reach an accord, or at 
least an accord that Barnett would honor.116 Lacking cooperation from state 
authorities, the Kennedy administration assembled a force of federal marshals and 
a hodgepodge of other federal officials composed of everyone from Department of 
Justice attorneys and border agents to federal prison guards to ensure Meredith was 
able to register and attend classes.117 On the day before Meredith was to register, 
federal officials set up a command center and camped out for the night at the 
Lyceum, a legendary building on the campus, to be prepared to help Meredith 
register the following morning.118 Mistakenly believing Meredith was in the 
FOOTBALL SCANDAL 189–213 (1986). A number of Bryant biographers have disagreed. 
See, e.g., DUNNAVANT, supra note 98, at 170. 
108 See KIRBY, supra note 107, at 91–148. 
109 See FIGONE, supra note 86, at 84. 
110 See id.; KIRBY, supra note 107, at 183–84. 
111 Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 138–39 (1967). 
112 Id. at 139. 
113 Id. at 140. 
114 CHARLES W. EAGLES, THE PRICE OF DEFIANCE: JAMES MEREDITH AND THE 
INTEGRATION OF OLE MISS 201–339 (2009) (discussing in detail the lengthy court battles 
preceding Meredith’s admission). 
115 RICHARD K. SCHER, POLITICS IN THE NEW SOUTH: REPUBLICANISM, RACE AND 
LEADERSHIP IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 215 (2d ed. 1997); EAGLES, supra note 114, at 
276–77 (“Determined to keep Meredith out of Ole Miss, the state’s leadership did not 
know what to do except to be obstructive.”). 
116 SCHER, supra note 115, at 215; ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., ROBERT KENNEDY 
AND HIS TIMES 337–39 (1978). 
117 EVAN THOMAS, ROBERT KENNEDY: HIS LIFE 200 (2000). 
118 Id. (“Unprepared and ignorant of local lore, the Kennedy team blundered in its 
choice of a place to stand. . . . The Lyceum and the Grove were sacred ground at Ole Miss. 
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Lyceum,119 a mob of more than two thousand five hundred persons attacked 
federal officials with Molotov cocktails, guns, and a bulldozer, which was turned 
into makeshift battering ram to break the federal line.120 By the time military 
reinforcements arrived in the middle of the night, one hundred and sixty federal 
officials had been injured, twenty-eight of them by gunfire, and two persons, a 
reporter and a local resident, were dead.121 The morning after, Meredith, who was 
escorted by five thousand troops, registered for classes.122 Enduring constant 
threats and harassment,123 Meredith lived with a federal marshal for the next two 
years until he graduated in 1963, becoming the first African American graduate 
from the University of Mississippi.124  
Van Savell, a young reporter who blended in well among the college students, 
had been part of a team of Associated Press (AP) reporters covering the integration 
of the University of Mississippi.125 In reporting on the rioting for the AP, Savell 
[Nicholas] Katzenbach later realized they might as well have decided to bivouac in Robert 
E. Lee’s tomb.”) 
119 SCHLESINGER, supra note 116, at 322. 
120 See JONATHAN ROSENBERG & ZACHERY KARABELL, KENNEDY, JOHNSON, AND THE 
QUEST FOR JUSTICE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS TAPES 47 (2003); ROBERT DALLEK, AN 
UNFINISHED LIFE: JOHN F. KENNEDY 1917–1963, at 516–17 (2003); THOMAS, supra note 
117, at 200–04. 
121 THOMAS, supra note 117, at 200. 
122 SCHER, supra note 115, at 215. When asked what was to be done after the rioting 
of the night before, Department of Justice attorney Nicholas Katzenbach stated, “we’re 
going to register Mr. Meredith at 8 o’clock.” SCHLESINGER, supra note 116, at 325. During 
the fall of 1962 at the height of the federal troops’ presence in Oxford, Mississippi (20,000 
soldiers), the campus looked more like a military encampment than a university with 
soldiers outnumbering students by a 5 to 1 ratio. FRANK LAMBERT, THE BATTLE OF OLE 
MISS: CIVIL RIGHTS V. STATES’ RIGHTS 128 (2010).  
123 MEREDITH COLEMAN MCGEE, JAMES MEREDITH: WARRIOR AND THE AMERICA 
THAT CREATED HIM 71–73 (2013). Describing his experience, Meredith, who had 
previously served in the military, stated, “I was not a student. I was a soldier in a war. . . . 
Students threw rocks and firecrackers at me. They insulted me, but I never allowed anyone 
to get close to me. . . . I considered myself engaged in a War from day one.” Id. at 72–73 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
124 Id. at 71–74. Reflecting upon the entirety of the experience, Meredith wrote to 
Robert Kennedy in 1963:  
 
I am a graduate of the University of Mississippi. For this I am proud of my 
Country . . . . The question always arises—was it worth the cost? . . . I believe 
that I echo the feelings of most Americans when I say that “no price is too high 
to pay for freedom of person, equality of opportunity, and human dignity.” 
 
Letter from J. H. Meredith to Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General, United States of 
America (Sept. 5, 1963), available at http://rfkcenter.org/james-meredith-17, archived at 
http://perma.cc/86H7-NQXH. 
125 Nancy Benac, A Fight Is What This Is, in BREAKING NEWS: HOW THE ASSOCIATED 
PRESS HAS COVERED WAR, PEACE, AND EVERYTHING ELSE 90, 95 (2007). 
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indicated that Walker, who was among the rioters, had “assumed command” of the 
crowd and “led a charge of students against federal marshals.”126 He added that 
Walker had climbed on a monument, exhorting the rioting crowd with the 
admonition “[d]on’t let up now. . . . You must be prepared for possible death. If 
you are not, go home now.”127 After the rioting, Walker was arrested and charged 
with, among other offenses, insurrection against the United States—these charges 
were later dropped.128 
Walker was not new to the spotlight. His military career had ended in 
controversy over his attempts to indoctrinate soldiers under his command using 
controversial voter-rating guides and materials from the John Birch Society.129 
Even before the rioting, Walker had assumed a leadership position in the 
opposition to integration of the University of Mississippi.130 In radio addresses, he 
called upon southerners to draw the line, saying “[i]t is time to move. We have 
talked, listened and been pushed around far too much for the anti-Christ Supreme 
Court. Bring your flags, your tents, and your skillets.”131 
Walker filed fifteen libel suits against the AP, specifically selecting southern 
towns in which newspapers carried the story and in which he thought a 
sympathetic jury pool could be found.132 He sought more than $33 million in 
damages.133 Walker conceded that he had been present and spoken to the students, 
but he insisted he counseled restraint, did not exercise any control over the crowd, 
126 Id. at 95–96 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
127 Id. at 95 (omission in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
128 Id. at 96. 
129 STEVEN E. ATKINS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN MODERN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 186 (2011). Walker, who had served with distinction in World War II 
and the Korean War, had also been assigned by President Eisenhower as the commanding 
officer to direct the military in aiding the integration of Central High School in Little Rock, 
Arkansas. Id. Walker only performed the latter function after his Commander-in-Chief 
refused to allow him to resign his commission. Id. The beginning of the end of Walker’s 
military career occurred with the publication of a 1961 article in Overseas Weekly that 
noted that Walker was using John Birch Society materials as anti-communist indoctrination 
material. SARA DIAMOND, ROADS TO DOMINION: RIGHT-WING MOVEMENTS AND 
POLITICAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 57 (1995). While the Pentagon did have an anti-
communist indoctrination education initiative, the John Birch Society materials confused 
the American Left with Soviet Communists. Id. The removal of Walker would become a 
major point of confrontation between the American right and left. Id. at 57–58; see also 
DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY AND GRASSROOTS CONSERVATISM: A 
WOMAN’S CRUSADE 101–02 (2005); DAVID TALBOT, BROTHERS: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF 
THE KENNEDY YEARS 71–72 (2007); Editorial, Fair Play for Gen. Walker, LIFE, Oct. 6, 
1961, at 4. 
130 Benac, supra note 125, at 96. 
131 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
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and did not lead a charge against federal marshals.134 The AP lost the defamation 
case Walker filed in Fort Worth, Texas, and the jury returned a verdict for 
$800,000, which was reduced to $500,000 by the trial court.135 The trial court 
explicitly declined to apply the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan standard; however, 
the court noted that if the actual malice standard had been applicable, it would 
have entered a directed verdict for the AP.136 The Texas Court of Appeals 
affirmed, and the Texas Supreme Court declined to review the decision.137 
Addressing Butts’s and Walker’s appeals, the primary issue before the Court 
was whether the constitutional safeguards afforded speech regarding public 
officials would be extended to those who did not work for the government. For 
reasons addressed in more detail in Part III.B below, the U.S. Supreme Court 
extended the actual malice standard to public figures.138 Though the Court 
concluded Butts had made a sufficient showing of wanton and reckless 
indifference to support a finding of actual malice, the Court’s application of the 
heightened standard required that the judgment for Walker be set aside.139 None of 
the justices, however, provided bright line rules for determining when a person is a 
public figure.140 In fact, the Court did not even define the term public figure.141 
 
C.  Rosenbloom v. Metromedia Inc. 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court continued to expand constitutional restrictions on 
defamation actions in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., though the Court’s focus, 
or at least the focus of the controlling plurality opinion, shifted from the status of 
the person defamed (public official/public figure) to considering whether the 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 142 (1967). 
137 Id. 
138 See id. at 155. In his plurality opinion, Justice Harlan did not impose the actual 
malice standard applicable to public officials but instead a less demanding gross negligence 
standard for public figures. Id. at 160, 166–67; Edward T. Fenno, Public Figure Libel: The 
Premium on Ignorance and the Race to the Bottom, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 253, 279–80 
(1995); Frederick Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 905, 932 (1984). 
However, five justices supported the application of the actual malice standard to public 
figures, though Justices Black and Douglas further maintained that absolute protection 
should be afforded to the press against defamation suits. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 
U.S. 323, 336 & n.7 (1974); see also Catherine Hancock, Origins of the Public Figure 
Doctrine in First Amendment Defamation Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81, 83 & n.11 
(2005–2006). 
139 Curtis Publ’g Co., 388 U.S. at 156–59. 
140 Lee Levine & Stephen Wermiel, The Landmark That Wasn’t: A First Amendment 
Play in Five Acts, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 n.10 (2013). 
141 See Jay Barth, Is False Imputation of Being Gay, Lesbian, or Bisexual Still 
Defamatory? The Arkansas Case, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 527, 529–30 (2012) 
(noting that “public figure” was only defined later in Gertz). 
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subject matter reported on constituted a matter of public concern.142 The case 
brought before the Court involved George Rosenbloom, a distributor of “nudist 
magazines” in Metropolitan Philadelphia.143 While the police had not been trying 
to arrest Rosenbloom, he had the misfortune of delivering magazines to a 
newsstand at the same time Philadelphia police were conducting an anti-obscenity 
raid, resulting in his arrest.144 With Rosenbloom in custody, police officers 
conducted a search of his home and a barn he used as a warehouse.145 During their 
search, officers found a copious amount of pornography.146 With this discovery, a 
captain with the Philadelphia Police Department Special Investigations Squad 
contacted multiple media outlets including Metromedia’s WIP Radio to report their 
find.147 
As part of its newscast on October 3, 1963, WIP Radio informed its listeners 
that 
 
City Cracks Down on Smut Merchants. The Special Investigations Squad 
raided the home of George Rosenbloom . . . this afternoon. Police 
confiscated 1,000 allegedly obscene books at Rosenbloom’s home and 
arrested him on charges of possession of obscene literature. The . . . 
Squad also raided a barn . . . and confiscated 3,000 obscene books. 
Captain Ferguson says he believes they have hit the supply of a main 
distributor of obscene material in Philadelphia.148 
 
Rosenbloom, who argued the materials were not obscene, filed suit, seeking an 
injunction to prevent the police from interfering with his business and an action 
against a number of the media outlets that had referred to the materials as 
obscene.149 WIP Radio, which was not part of Rosenbloom’s original suit, covered 
court proceedings in these cases.150 Though it did not mention Rosenbloom by 
name, the radio station informed its listeners that a distributor of pornography was 
litigating in an attempt to get a local television station and newspaper to “lay off 
the smut literature racket” and that “[t]he girlie-book peddler[] say[s] the police 
crackdown and continued reference to [his] borderline literature as smut or filth is 
hurting [his] business.”151 
142 King, supra note 6, at 662–63. 
143 FRALEIGH & TUMAN, supra note 58, at 180. 
144 RICHARD LABUNSKI, LIBEL AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: LEGAL HISTORY AND 
PRACTICE IN PRINT AND BROADCASTING 134 (1987). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 134–35. 
147 Id. at 135. 
148 Id. (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 33 (1971)). 
149 Id. 
150 Id.  
151 Id. (quoting Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 34–35). 
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After learning about WIP’s broadcasts, Rosenbloom contacted the station, 
asserting that his materials were not obscene.152 The radio station informed 
Rosenbloom that the District Attorney’s Office had indicated the materials were 
obscene.153 The District Attorney’s Office was wrong; the trial court ordered entry 
of an acquittal on the criminal obscenity charges.154 Following his acquittal, 
Rosenbloom brought a defamation suit in federal court against WIP Radio.155 The 
jury returned a $775,000 verdict for Rosenbloom, but the trial court judge reduced 
the amount of the verdict to $275,000.156 The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit reversed the trial court, concluding that the actual malice standard 
applied even though Rosenbloom was not a public figure because the broadcasts 
were about matters of public concern and Rosenbloom had not shown actual 
malice.157  
A fractured Supreme Court applied the actual malice standard to 
Rosenbloom’s defamation claim but could not agree on a reason for doing so.158 
The three-justice plurality authored by Justice Brennan reasoned that “[i]f a matter 
is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely 
because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual 
did not ‘voluntarily’ choose to become involved.”159 Brennan added that “[t]he 
public’s primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the 
participant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the 
participant’s prior anonymity or notoriety.”160 Thus, the plurality viewed its 
standard as honoring “the commitment to robust debate on public issues, which is 
embodied in the First Amendment, by extending constitutional protection to all 
discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern, 
without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous.”161  
The Rosenbloom plurality did not ignore arguments in favor of retaining the 
distinction between public figures and private persons.162 However, the members 
of the plurality concluded such an approach would improperly result in 
“dampening discussion of issues of public or general concern because they happen 
to involve private citizens,” thus a heightened standard needed to be applied.163 In 
the plurality’s view, “[v]oluntarily or not, we are all ‘public’ men to some 
152 Id.  
153 Id.  
154 Id. at 155–56. 
155 POWE, supra note 29, at 92. 
156 See id. 
157 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892, 896–98 (3d Cir. 1969), aff’d, 403 
U.S. 29 (1971). 
158 See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52, 55–57, 62 (1971). 
159 Id. at 43. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 43–44. 
162 Id. at 45–47. 
163 Id. at 48. 
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degree.”164 Thus, the controlling question after Rosenbloom in determining 
whether the actual malice standard applies was whether the defamatory statement 
related to a matter of public concern.165 This approach, which would be the high-
water mark for media protection against defamation suits, would be 
jurisprudentially short-lived, but scholarly attachment thereto endures. 
 
D.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 
 
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Supreme Court redirected its focus to the 
status of the defamed plaintiff in determining whether the actual malice standard 
applied, and in doing so the Court created a new structural framework for 
analyzing defamation cases.166 The events that gave rise to Gertz began with an 
extended period of harassment of a youth by a police officer.167 Chicago police 
officer Richard Nuccio regarded Robert Nelson, a nineteen-year-old in the 
neighborhood he patrolled, as a hoodlum.168 Nuccio stopped and patted down 
Nelson sixty to one hundred times over the course of eighteen months and never 
found a weapon or contraband.169 On June 4, 1968, Nelson either ran from or was 
already running (he had been a runner on his high school track and field team) 
when he encountered Nuccio.170 The officer directed him to stop; Nelson did 
not.171 Without warning, Nuccio shot and killed Nelson.172 The Chicago District 
Attorney’s Office prosecuted Nuccio for murder.173 At trial, Nuccio claimed self-
defense arguing that Nelson had lunged at him with a knife; however, no knife was 
recovered.174 Furthermore, the medical evidence established that Nelson had been 
shot in the back at a distance of approximately eighty feet.175 A jury convicted 
Nuccio of second-degree murder.176  
Nelson’s parents pursued civil monetary damages.177 Another attorney 
referred the Nelsons to Elmer Gertz.178 On behalf of the Nelsons, Gertz pursued a 
164 Id.  
165 David W. Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199, 227 n.175 (1976); Marin Roger Scordato, The 
International Legal Environment for Serious Political Reporting Has Fundamentally 
Changed: Understanding the Revolutionary New Era of English Defamation Law, 40 
CONN. L. REV. 165, 191–92 (2007). 
166 See King, supra note 6, at 663–65. 
167 See ELMER GERTZ, GERTZ V. ROBERT WELCH, INC.: THE STORY OF A LANDMARK 
LIBEL CASE 15–16 (1992). 
168 Id. at 15. 
169 Id. at 16. 
170 Id. at 19. 
171 See id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 11–16.  
174 Id. at 12, 15–16. 
175 Id. 
176 Id.  
177 Id. at 18–19. 
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strategy of filing actions in both state and federal courts, naming as defendants 
Nuccio and the City of Chicago in the state court action but naming only Nuccio in 
federal court, where liability and immunity issues were more likely to bar recovery 
against the city given the willful and illegal nature of Nuccio’s conduct.179  
Little did Gertz know at the time, he was about to find himself in the 
crosshairs of the John Birch Society. Created in the 1950s and rising to the height 
of its influence in the 1960s, the John Birch Society was an ultraconservative 
anticommunist organization.180 The organization was focused on safeguarding the 
nation against communist conspiracies. Its “message centered around the idea that 
there was a vast left-wing conspiracy of American liberals, international 
communists, and moderate American Republicans who worked together to 
undermine the Christian values and individual liberties of Americans.”181 By 1968 
the John Birch Society had become convinced that communists were trying to 
undermine local law enforcement by discrediting police officers.182 Robert Welch, 
the founder of the John Birch Society and the publisher of its monthly magazine 
American Opinion, articulated that the end game of the conspiracy was to create 
public pressure to replace local police with a national police force, which could 
later be used to support a communist dictatorship.183 The March 1969 issue of 
American Opinion contained an article entitled FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio and 
the War on Police.184 The article alleged that Nuccio’s prosecution had been part 
of the communist campaign against local police.185 The article, among other errors, 
accused Gertz of being a Communist, framing Nuccio, assisting in planning the 
1968 demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention, and having a 
criminal record.186 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Rosenbloom, Gertz filed a 
defamation action in the United States District Court for Northern District of 
Illinois against Robert Welch, Inc., the publisher of American Opinion.187 Drawing 
upon the Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts decision, the publisher argued that Gertz 
was a public official and/or public figure and that the article was related to a matter 
178 Id. 
179 Id.  
180 Thomas Lansford, John Birch Society, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGION 
AND POLITICS 233, 233–34 (2003). 
181 Thomas Lansford, John Birch Society, in 2 GUNS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: AN 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE, AND THE LAW 322, 322 (Gregg Lee 
Carter ed., 2002). 
182 Diane L. Borden, Cyberlibel: Time to Flame the Times Standard, in THE 
ELECTRONIC GRAPEVINE: RUMOR, REPUTATION, AND REPORTING IN THE NEW ON-LINE 
ENVIRONMENT 91, 96 (Diane L. Borden & Kerric Harvey eds., 1998). 
183 LABUNSKI, supra note 144, at 148. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 149; KENNETH C. CREECH, ELECTRONIC MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 338–
40 (5th ed. 2007). 
187 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997, 998 (N.D. Ill. 1970). 
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of public concern.188 Gertz countered that the actual malice standard did not apply 
to him because he was neither a public official nor a public figure.189 The trial 
court, which suffered from confusion throughout the case regarding the applicable 
constitutional defamation standard, allowed the case to proceed to a jury verdict on 
a less restrictive standard than actual malice, which resulted in a $50,000 judgment 
for Gertz.190 However, after the trial, the trial court set aside the verdict, having 
determined the actual malice standard applied and that Gertz had not shown actual 
malice.191 Applying Rosenbloom, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed.192 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case193 and subsequently 
concluded that the actual malice standard did not apply to Gertz, thereby reframing 
the constitutional constraints on defamation claims.194 
 
II.  THE GERTZ CATEGORIZATION STRUCTURE195 
 
The Gertz Court structured an approach to defamation suits designed to 
address the inherent tension between states’ interest in redressing injuries arising 
from defamation and the constitutional safeguards necessary for a vigorous and 
uninhibited press.196 While theoretically “the balance between the needs of the 
press and the individual’s claim to compensation for wrongful injury might be 
struck on a case-by-case basis,” the Gertz Court recognized the impracticability 
and substantive undesirability of such an approach.197 Instead, the Court balanced 
the competing interests by creating categorical groupings, assigning different types 
of defamation plaintiffs to different categories, and setting forth rules to govern 
those categories.  
Pursuant to Gertz, plaintiffs in defamation cases can be classified into one of 
five categories: (1) public officials, (2) all-purpose public figures, (3) limited-
purpose public figures, (4) involuntary public figures, and (5) private 
individuals.198 The public official designation applies “at the very least to those 
among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public 
to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental 
188 See id. at 998–1000. 
189 See LABUNSKI, supra note 144, at 149. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 149–50. 
192 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801, 808 (7th Cir. 1972). 
193 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 410 U.S. 925, 925 (1973). 
194 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 332 (1974). 
195 Not all of the contours set forth below are contained in Gertz itself or its 
predecessors. Some aspects of the structure have been clarified by post-Gertz decisions, but 
the foundation upon which those subsequent Supreme Court decisions have been placed is 
Gertz itself.  
196 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342. 
197 Id. at 343. 
198 See JAMES SAMMATARO, FILM AND MULTIMEDIA AND THE LAW § 5:19, at 469–71 
(2013).  
                                                          
2014] LOST INVOLUNTARY PUBLIC FIGURE 973 
affairs.”199 For the heightened protections of the actual malice test to apply to a 
public official,200 the allegedly defamatory speech must be related to official 
conduct201 or fitness for office.202 The constitutional protection afforded by the 
actual malice standard does not apply to people simply because they are public 
employees.203  
As for the second category, the Gertz Court described all-purpose public 
figures as persons who “occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence 
that they are deemed public figures for all purposes.”204 All-purpose public figures, 
a category into which a relatively small number of persons will fall,205 are 
individuals with significant fame and notoriety, i.e., “household names.”206 There 
is a societal expectation that such persons are fodder for public discussion.207 
Because of the impact of being categorized as such, the Gertz Court established a 
199 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). 
200 See SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 3:23, at 3-60. 
201 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964). 
202 The Supreme Court in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), expressly 
concluded that the heightened actual malice standard reached beyond official conduct to 
fitness for office, including considerations of private character: 
 
The New York Times rule is not rendered inapplicable merely because an 
official’s private reputation, as well as his public reputation, is harmed. The 
public-official rule protects the paramount public interest in a free flow of 
information to the people concerning public officials, their servants. To this end, 
anything which might touch on an official’s fitness for office is relevant. Few 
personal attributes are more germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, 
malfeasance, or improper motivation, even though these characteristics may also 
affect the official’s private character. 
 
Id. at 77. Utilizing even starker language, the Supreme Court observed in Monitor Patriot 
Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971), that 
 
[g]iven the realities of our political life, it is by no means easy to see what 
statements about a candidate might be altogether without relevance to his fitness 
for the office he seeks. The clash of reputations is the staple of election 
campaigns, and damage to reputation is, of course, the essence of libel. 
 
Id. at 275. 
203 See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8 (1979). 
204 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). 
205 DAVID A. ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER’S GUIDE § 5:6, at 5-52 (2003); 
Dennise Mulvihill, Irving v. Penguin: Historians on Trial and the Determination of Truth 
Under English Libel Law, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 217, 247 (2000). 
206 1A ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, 
PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS § 4:8, at 4-23 (3d ed. 2014); Gilles, supra note 1, at 251 n.118. 
207 Ellyn M. Angelotti, Twibel Law: What Defamation and its Remedies Look Like in 
the Age of Twitter, 13 J. HIGH TECH. L. 430, 446 (2013) (noting that “[s]ociety expects the 
public to discuss and critique these people”). 
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presumption in favor of finding a person to be a limited-purpose as opposed to an 
all-purpose public figure. The Court declared that “[a]bsent clear evidence of 
general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement in the 
affairs of society, an individual should not be deemed a public personality for all 
aspects of his life.”208 If the plaintiff in a defamation suit is an all-purpose public 
figure, the constitutional protections of the actual malice standard apply.209 By 
definition, at least for purposes of defamation suits, there are no matters of private 
concern for all-purpose public figures.210 They are deemed a public figure for “all 
purposes and in all contexts.”211 
Addressing the third category, the Gertz Court described limited-purpose 
public figures as persons who have “thrust themselves to the forefront of particular 
public controversies” or “the vortex of [a] public issue,” “in order to influence the 
resolution of the issues involved” and in doing so “have assumed roles of especial 
prominence in the affairs of society.”212 Such persons are public figures in 
connection with matters upon which they have assumed such a role, “but in all 
other aspects of their lives they remain private figures.”213 Accordingly, they are 
public figures “for a limited range of issues.”214 Because the categorization of a 
person as a limited-purpose public figure inherently involves a determination of 
whether the speech at issue addresses a “public controversy” or a “public issue,” if 
the plaintiff is classified as a limited-purpose public figure, a matter of public 
concern necessarily will be implicated, and the actual malice standard will 
apply.215  
Describing the fourth category, the involuntary public figure category (a 
classification into which the Gertz Court anticipated few would fall), the Court 
defined involuntary public figures as persons who are “drawn into a particular 
public controversy” and “become a public figure through no purposeful action of 
[their] own.”216 As with limited-purpose public figures, because categorization as 
an involuntary public figure requires a finding of a “public controversy” into which 
the person has been drawn, invariably a matter of public concern will be 
implicated, and the actual malice standard will apply.217 
Finally, persons who are not public officials, all-purpose public figures, 
limited-purpose public figures, or involuntary public figures are categorized as 
208 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. 
209 SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 3:23, at 3-60. 
210 Dale D. Goble, Of Defamation and Decisionmaking: Wiemer v. Rankin and the 
Abdication of Appellate Responsibility, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 18 n.76 (1991–1992). 
211 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351. 
212 Id. at 345, 352. 
213 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES IN MEDIA CONTENT: INTERNET, 
BROADCAST, AND PRINT § 6:38, at 6-331 (2d ed. 2011). 
214 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351. 
215 SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 3:23, at 3-60. 
216 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 351. 
217 See W. Wat Hopkins, The Involuntary Public Figure: Not So Dead After All, 21 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 27, 30 (2003). 
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private individuals. As part of balancing the competing needs for a vigorous and 
uninhibited press with the ability of the states to protect private individuals from 
defamation, the Gertz Court, reversing Rosenbloom, removed the constitutional 
mandate that the actual malice standard apply in cases in which the aggrieved 
plaintiff is a private individual where the matter involved is one of public 
concern.218 However, the Gertz Court prohibited states from setting strict liability 
standards in defamation suits but otherwise enabled states to set their own 
standards for private individuals.219 
 
III.  THE EROSION OF THE GERTZ STRUCTURE 
 
Like a beautifully crafted sandcastle built too close to the shore, these 
categorical distinctions have been hit by successive waves of First Amendment 
pressure that have taken a toll on the edifice. The categorical lines and rationales 
advanced in Gertz are worn and rounded. Rather than becoming clearer over time 
through courts’ application of the Gertz framework, the categories have become 
more confused, unsettled, and variant.220  
The Gertz framework has been eroded in at least five significant respects, 
each of which is discussed below. First pressure from the First Amendment has 
resulted in state and lower-federal courts expanding the category of persons who 
218 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346–48. 
219 Id. at 346–48 & n.10. Commentators addressing the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), have argued that 
if the defamatory statements regarding a private person are not addressed to a matter of 
public concern, then strict liability could apply:  
 
The United States Supreme Court, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss 
Builders, Inc., held that when a private person who is neither a public official 
nor a public figure sues for defamation arising from publication of matters that 
are not of public concern, she need not prove actual damages as required in the 
private person, public concern cases. Thus the common law rule of presumed 
damages can be applied by the states to cases in this category if the states are so 
minded. 
Several decisions have said or assumed that the Dun & Bradstreet case 
means that all of the common law rules remain intact, not merely the damages 
rule. That would mean that in the private person case where the issue is not of 
public concern, the states would also be free to presume falsehood as well as 
damages, and possibly even to presume that the defendant was at fault; courts 
could go back to the old common law of prima facie strict liability in this class 
of cases. If the rules develop along these lines, courts in private person cases 
will be required to determine what counts as an issue of public concern. 
 
3 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 557 (2d ed. 2011 & Supp. 2013) (citations 
omitted). 
220 See King, supra note 6, at 650 (referring generally to the post-New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan defamation jurisprudence). 
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constitute public officials, bringing that category into conflict with the rationale 
underpinning Gertz’s distinguishing of private individuals from public figures.221 
Second, the definition of what constitutes a matter of public controversy has also 
significantly expanded to incorporate a significantly broadened scope of persons 
who will qualify as a public figure.222 Third, private individuals’ lack of access to 
channels of communications provided one of the two critical reasons for the Gertz 
Court to distinguish public figures from private individuals. Forty years of 
revolutionary technological change has dramatically reduced the force of this 
rationale for distinguishing public figures from private persons.223 Fourth, the 
Gertz Court’s second reason for distinguishing public figures from private 
individuals turned upon the Court’s view that public figures had voluntarily 
accepted such scrutiny through their actions whereas private individuals had not. 
Responding to First Amendment pressures, state and lower-federal courts, 
however, have been expanding the concept of voluntariness into forms that reduce 
the persuasiveness of the Court’s reasoning in distinguishing public figures from 
private individuals on this basis.224 Fifth, Justice William Brennan’s contention 
advanced in his dissenting opinion in Gertz that there is no such thing as a private 
person resonates significantly more today than it would or should have in 1974.225  
 
A.  Erosion of the Narrow Understanding of Who Constitutes a Public Official 
 
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger, noted in dicta in 
Hutchinson v. Proxmire226 that while the Supreme Court “has not provided precise 
boundaries for the category of ‘public official’; it cannot be thought to include all 
public employees.”227 Contextualizing low-level public employees within the 
broader scope of Gertz’s analysis, venerable defamation scholar Professor David 
Elder has convincingly argued that imposition of the actual malice standard to low-
level public employees is antithetical to the general reasoning behind the Gertz 
framework.228 He notes that “[l]ow-ranking or ‘garden variety’ public employees 
do not in any realistic sense assume the risk of enhanced press scrutiny and they 
generally have little access to the media for rebuttal on a ‘regular and continuing’ 
or other basis.”229 Accordingly, Elder concludes that such low-level employees 
have not forfeited their status as private individuals and need not meet the 
heightened actual malice requirement; relatedly, Elder champions courts adhering 
to “the thoughtful analysis of Justice Brennan in Rosenblatt v. Baer.”230 As 
221 See infra Part III.A. 
222 See infra Part III.B. 
223 See infra Part III.C. 
224 See infra Part III.D. 
225 See infra Part III.E. 
226 443 U.S. 111 (1979). 
227 Id. at 119 n.8. 
228 See ELDER, supra note 205, § 5:1. 
229 Id. § 5:1, at 5-10 to -11. 
230 Id. § 5:1, at 5-11. 
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addressed above, Justice Brennan indicated that the public official designation 
applies “at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees 
who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control 
over the conduct of governmental affairs.”231 Elder would strictly hold the line “at 
the very least” level and maintain a restrictive interpretation thereof.232 This would 
maintain continuity with the broader Gertz analysis and avoid application of the 
actual malice test to low-level government employees such as, in Elder’s view, 
non-command level police officers and public school teachers.233 
That aspiration has not, however, matched reality in terms of how many state 
and federal courts have approached the classification of public employees. While 
there are a significant number of decisions in which courts have drawn lines in a 
manner akin to what Elder suggests,234 the dam has been breached, and actual 
application has moved far afield. Drawing a contrast with the narrow high-level 
official understanding advanced by some courts and scholars, the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals, referencing police officers as an example, observed that “[i]n 
practice, the term [public official] is now used more broadly and includes many 
government employees.”235 Professor Laurence Tribe has declared that irrespective 
of the dicta in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, a narrow and restrictive understanding of 
what constitutes a public official “has never been applied by the Supreme Court, 
and lower courts have tended to disregard it as well, with the net effect that the 
term ‘public official’ now embraces virtually all persons affiliated with the 
government, such as most ordinary civil servants, including public school teachers 
and policemen.”236 Elder has observed that state and lower-federal courts in his 
view “often ‘grossly interpret[], flagrantly misappl[y], or blatantly ignore[]’” the 
restrictive and narrow understanding of what constitutes a public official.237 
Furthermore, he adds that in doing so, these courts “recognize the anomaly of 
simultaneously adopting generally restrictive criteria for the public figure status 
and open-ended criteria for the public official status.”238 
Nor is it apparent that state and lower-federal courts are proceeding in a 
manner contrary to the Supreme Court’s analysis in Rosenblatt v. Baer by adopting 
a more expansive understanding of who qualifies as a public official. Justice 
Brennan certainly thought the broader understanding reflected in state and lower-
231 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). The language was evidently added to 
the opinion to appease Justice Harlan, who did not want to extend the actual malice 
standard to low-level government employees “without a great deal more thought.” LEWIS, 
supra note 19, at 172. 
232 ELDER, supra note 205, § 5:1, at 5:10 to -11. 
233 Id. § 5:1, at 5-19. 
234 See id. § 5:1, at 5-24 to 5-31. 
235 Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 65 (1st Cir. 2003). 
236 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 866 (2d ed. 1988). 
237 ELDER, supra note 205, § 5:1, at 5-11 to -12 (quoting David Elder, Defamation, 
Public Officialdom and the Rosenblatt v. Baer Criteria—A Proposal for Revivification: 
Two Decades After New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 33 BUFF. L. REV. 579, 667 (1984)). 
238 Id. § 5:1, at 5-12 (citation omitted). 
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federal court decisions was the correct reading of his opinion.239 Writing post-
Rosenblatt and Gertz, he observed, 
 
We recognized [in Rosenblatt v. Baer], however, that First Amendment 
protection cannot turn on formalistic tests of how “high” up the ladder a 
particular government employee stands. Rather, we determined, the 
focus must be on the nature of the public employee’s function and the 
public’s particular concern with his work. Accordingly, we held: 
 
Where a position in government has such apparent importance 
that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications 
and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general 
public interest in the qualifications and performance of all 
government employees, . . . the New York Times malice 
standards apply. 
 
In Rosenblatt itself, we found this standard satisfied with respect to Baer, 
a supervisor of a county ski resort employed by and responsible to 
county commissioners.240 
 
Addressing an Ohio Supreme Court decision that had, in his view, adopted an 
excessively narrow understanding of what constitutes a public official for purpose 
of application of the actual malice standard, Justice Brennan stated, 
 
The Ohio court apparently read the language in Rosenblatt referring 
to government employees having “substantial responsibility for or 
control over the conduct of government affairs” as restricting the public 
official designation to officials who set governmental policy. This 
interpretation led it to conclude that finding a public employee like 
Milkovich241 to be a “public official” for purposes of defamation law 
“would unduly exaggerate the ‘public official’ designation beyond its 
original intendment.”  
The Ohio court has seriously misapprehended our decision in 
Rosenblatt. Indeed, the status of a public school teacher as a “public 
official” for purposes of applying the New York Times rule follows a 
fortiori from the reasoning of the Court in Rosenblatt . . . . 
. . . [I]t is self-evident that “the public has an independent interest in 
the qualifications and performance” of those who teach in the public high 
schools that goes “beyond the general public interest in the qualifications 
239 Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953, 957–60 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
240 Id. at 957–58 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 
(1966)). 
241 Michael Milkovich was a high school wrestling coach and a teacher. Id. at 955. 
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and performance of all government employees[.]” Public school teachers 
thus fall squarely within the rationale of New York Times and Rosenblatt. 
Moreover, Diadiun’s column challenged Milkovich’s qualifications to 
teach young students in light of his conduct in connection with the Maple 
Heights/Mentor High School incident. It is precisely this type of 
discussion that New York Times and its progeny seek to protect.242 
 
The more expansive rendering of the public-official category by many state 
courts and lower-federal courts arose neither from happenstance nor inattention. 
The broader understanding of the public official category is consistent with 
honoring the core purpose of the First Amendment, enabling self-governance, a 
purpose that is discussed in more detail in Part III.B below. In an article that offers 
a strong defense of application of the actual malice standard to public school 
teachers, Richard Johnson noted, 
 
[m]ost parents take an acute interest in the “qualifications and 
performance” of any stranger who has . . . power over their children for 
six or seven hours per day. This interest is likely to exist even for people 
who are mostly indifferent to or ignorant of the “qualifications and 
performance” of senators, governors, and the secretary of agriculture—
all of whom are unquestionably public officials.243 
 
This vital role for teachers has not gone unnoticed by courts. For instance, an 
Illinois appeals court noted that “[p]ublic school teachers and coaches, and the 
conduct of such teachers and coaches and their policies, are of as much concern to 
the community as are other ‘public officials’ and ‘public figures.’”244 For similar 
reasons, courts have regularly concluded that even low-ranking police officers are 
public officials; for example, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that 
242 Id. at 958–60 (citations omitted). Ted Diadiun, a sports columnist for a local 
newspaper, wrote a column criticizing Milkovich not only for his actions related to a melee 
that broke-out at a wrestling match, resulting in multiple injuries requiring treatment in a 
hospital, but also misrepresentation of the surrounding events at a hearing thereupon to the 
Ohio High School Athletic Association. Id. at 955–57. 
243 Richard E. Johnson, No More Teachers’ Dirty Looks—Now They Sue: An Analysis 
of Plaintiff Status Determinations in Defamation Actions by Public Educators, 17 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 761, 791 (1990); see also Peter S. Cane, Note, Defamation of Teachers: Behind 
the Times?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1191, 1206–07 (1988) (“Education is undeniably an area 
of intense concern to the public, and educators are the most appropriate focus of that 
concern.”). 
244 Basarich v. Rodeghero, 321 N.E.2d 739, 742 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974); see, e.g., Kelley 
v. Bonney, 606 A.2d 693, 710 (Conn. 1992) (“Unquestionably, members of society are 
profoundly interested in the qualifications and performance of the teachers who are 
responsible for educating and caring for the children in their classrooms.”); Johnston v. 
Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Okla. 1978) (“[W]e can think of no 
higher community involvement touching more families and carrying more public interest 
than the public school system.”). 
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“[a]lthough a comparably low-ranking government official, a patrolman’s office, if 
abused, has great potential for social harm and thus invites independent interest in 
the qualifications and performance of the person who holds the position.”245 
Accordingly, courts almost invariably classify police officers as public officials.246 
Reflecting the self-government rationale in support of this categorization of police 
officers, Professor Rodney Smolla has observed that “[i]t is hard to conceive of 
speech more vital to a free and democratic society than speech concerning police 
officials, for the police are the embodiment of the government’s maintenance of 
social order.”247 Professor Smolla’s observation provides an accurate and telling 
indication of why state and lower-federal courts have adopted a more expansive 
understanding of the category of public officials and the First Amendment values 
served thereby. It does not, however, lessen Professor Elder’s observation, that this 
approach, understandable and warranted as it is, puts public official classification 
at odds with the rationale underlying the Gertz categorization framework 
distinguishing public figures from private individuals.248  
 
B.  Erosion of the Narrow Understanding of What Constitutes a Public 
Controversy 
 
Chief Justice Warren articulated the reason for extending the actual malice 
constitutional safeguard to include speech related to public figures upon matters of 
public concern in his concurring opinion in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts: 
 
To me, differentiation between “public figures” and “public 
officials” and adoption of separate standards of proof for each have no 
basis in law, logic, or First Amendment policy. Increasingly in this 
country, the distinctions between governmental and private sectors are 
blurred. Since the depression of the 1930’s and World War II there has 
been a rapid fusion of economic and political power, a merging of 
science, industry, and government, and a high degree of interaction 
between the intellectual, governmental, and business worlds. Depression, 
war, international tensions, national and international markets, and the 
surging growth of science and technology have precipitated national and 
international problems that demand national and international solutions. 
245 Moriarty v. Lippe, 294 A.2d 326, 330–31 (Conn. 1972); see also Rotkiewicz v. 
Sadowsky, 730 N.E.2d 282, 287 (Mass. 2000) (noting that “because of the broad powers 
vested in police officers and the great potential for abuse of those powers, as well as police 
officers’ high visibility within and impact on a community, that police officers, even 
patrol-level police officers such as the plaintiff, are ‘public officials’ for purposes of 
defamation”). 
246 SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 2:104, at 2-176; David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth 
Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 527 (1991) (noting that “police officers are almost 
invariably classed as public officials, no matter how low their rank”). 
247 SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 2:104, at 2-176 to -177. 
248 See ELDER, supra note 205, § 5:1, at 5-9 to -12. 
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While these trends and events have occasioned a consolidation of 
governmental power, power has also become much more organized in 
what we have commonly considered to be the private sector. In many 
situations, policy determinations which traditionally were channeled 
through formal political institutions are now originated and implemented 
through a complex array of boards, committees, commissions, 
corporations, and associations, some only loosely connected with the 
Government. This blending of positions and power has also occurred in 
the case of individuals so that many who do not hold public office at the 
moment are nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of 
important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in 
areas of concern to society at large.249  
 
Chief Justice’s Warren’s portrait of the public figure, which provided the 
foundation for the Gertz Court’s embrace and structuring of the public-figure 
category,250 is plainly the image of “a nominally private person [who] exercises as 
much, if not more, influence on the determination of public policy issues as do 
many public officials.”251 In that sense, the public figure doctrine “is heavily 
grounded in the public policy of facilitating free social discourse—those who 
voluntarily seek to influence events and issues may appropriately be forced to 
accept as part of the bargain a greater risk of defamation.”252  
In adopting such an approach, the Court honors the core self-governance 
purpose of the First Amendment.253 Protections for freedom of speech are naturally 
deduced from principles of self-government, which require the electorate to be able 
to gain sufficient knowledge to fulfill its responsibilities.254 Simply stated, “speech 
concerning public affairs . . . is the essence of self-government.”255 In absence of 
the information derived from such speech, “citizens cannot play their assigned 
roles in choosing and instructing their representatives and in participating in the 
formation of public policy.”256 Even where the role of the electorate is viewed as 
249 Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163–64 (1967) (Warren, C.J., 
concurring).  
250 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974); see also Schauer, 
supra note 138, at 914.  
251 Schauer, supra note 138, at 916.  
252 SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 2:35.50, at 2-64.35. 
253 See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 1024 
(2011) (noting the “core self-governance goals of the First Amendment”); Lyrissa Barnett 
Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 799, 839 (stating that “[i]t is generally agreed that a core purpose of the First 
Amendment is to foster the ideal of democratic self-governance”). 
254 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 27 (1948); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 
1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255.  
255 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964).  
256 Lidsky, supra note 253, at 810. 
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more responsive to than generative of public policy, political speech protections 
still serve a “checking value,” allowing for “checking the abuse of power by public 
officials” through voters’ use of an electoral “veto power to be employed when the 
decisions of officials pass certain bounds.”257 Whatever disagreements the 
Supreme Court has had over the exact applications of the First Amendment, there 
has been consensus that the constitutional guarantee protecting freedom of speech 
safeguards discussions of governmental action and inaction.258 With nominally 
private persons exercising considerable influence in guiding and directing public 
policy questions, it is readily apparent that such persons have entered the arena of 
public policy determination.259  
However, Professor Frederick Schauer has properly observed that the Court’s 
archetype of the public figure as a political actor engaged in influencing and 
directing political affairs “is only a part, and perhaps only comparatively small 
part, of the domain of public figures. The universe of public figures includes many 
people whose involvement in or influence on public policy matters is either 
attenuated or nonexistent.”260 For example, the Supreme Court’s recognition of 
Butts as a public figure has given rise “to a substantial amount of case law 
according public figure status to sports figures with little or no specific, reasoned 
discussion of the rationale for such a designation.”261 Professor Smolla does not 
make the mistake of failing to provide reasoned articulation in arguing for athletes 
as public figures. To the contrary, he argues for doing so in straightforward and 
cogent terms: 
 
Professional athletes voluntarily enter the “arena,” quite literally the 
“sports arena,” and issues germane to their performance or fitness, 
including issues relating to mental and physical health, but also to their 
character and position in society as role models, justify treating 
professional athletes as public figures and also justifies a reasonably 
broad understanding of the range of issues concerning the professional 
athlete’s life that falls within the perimeter of that public figure status.262 
 
While Professor Smolla’s defense of the view of athletes as public figures is a 
strong one, it is also significantly removed from the underlying rationale for 
imposing the same heightened constitutional protections to speech regarding public 
257 Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 521, 527, 542 (1977). 
258 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966); Margaret Tarkington, A First 
Amendment Theory for Protecting Attorney Speech, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 27, 60 (2011) 
(noting that “the Court carefully protects political speech, considering it at the ‘core’ of the 
First Amendment”). 
259 See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163–64 (1967) (Warren, C.J., 
concurring). 
260 Schauer, supra note 138, at 917.  
261 ELDER, supra note 205, § 5:20, at 5-161 (citation omitted). 
262 SMOLLA, supra note 213, § 6:40, at 6-361. 
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figures as public officials.263 Athletes are not thrusting themselves into issues of 
public policy seeking to impact the resolution thereof; rather, they are engaging in 
an occupation that attracts public attention. It is not necessary that the latest gossip 
about an athlete’s injury be discussed for the citizenry to participate in democratic 
self-governance.  
While weakening the citadel walls of the underlying justifications for the 
categorical structure devised by Gertz, state and lower-federal courts’ embracing 
of an understanding of public controversy that extends beyond the political sphere 
is not errant. To the contrary, such an approach accurately reflects the broader non-
self-governance constitutional purposes served by the speech and press protections 
of the First Amendment. As noted by Alexis de Tocqueville in discussing the 
importance of a free press in America, “[i]t is not political opinions only, but all 
the views of men which are influenced by freedom of the press. It modifies mores 
as well as laws.”264 In accordance therewith, the U.S. Supreme Court has not 
limited the protections of freedom of speech to purely political speech.265 To the 
contrary, the Court has recognized that “guarantees for speech and press are not the 
preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as those 
are to healthy government.”266 Protected speech could also, for example, be related 
to economic, religious, or cultural matters267 because First Amendment protections 
embrace a “right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, 
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences.”268 In fact, in recent years the 
non-political entertainment-related speech issues that have been before the 
Supreme Court have been so pronounced in terms of their “sheer volume, [that] . . . 
media entertainment speech seems to be subtly changing the cultural backdrop of 
the First Amendment, relegating political speech to a subordinate level within the 
general cultural awareness,” though the actual importance of political speech is 
undiminished.269 
In addition to its role in democratic self-governance, free speech is also 
critical for (1) ascertaining truth, (2) realizing individual self-fulfillment, (3) 
enabling participation from members of society in decision-making on non-
263 Compare id. (contending that it is justified to treat professional athletes as public 
figures), with Schauer, supra note 138, at 917 (arguing that, for the most part, athletes are 
not public figures because they have “little, if any, effect on questions of politics, public 
policy, or the organization or determination of societal affairs”); see also Curtis Publ’g 
Co., 388 U.S. at 162–64 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (outlining the rationales for applying 
the same standard to public figures and public officials). 
264 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 180 (J. P. Mayer ed., George 
Lawrence trans., 1969). 
265 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967). 
266 Id. 
267 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 
268 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
269 Patrick M. Garry, The First Amendment and Non-Political Speech: Exploring a 
Constitutional Model That Focuses on the Existence of Alternative Channels of 
Communication, 72 MO. L. REV. 477, 478 (2007). 
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political societal questions, and (4) maintaining a balance between societal stability 
and change.270 First, addressing the role of free speech in the ascertainment of 
truth, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes offered an indelible image of the marketplace 
of ideas in which purchase of truth is to be found through a Darwinian struggle.271 
Justice Holmes wrote, 
 
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly 
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a 
certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law 
and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to 
indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a man says that he 
has squared the circle, or that you do not care whole-heartedly for the 
result, or that you doubt either your power or your premises. But when 
men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may 
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of 
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free 
trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to 
get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the 
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at 
any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is 
an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our 
salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While 
that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally 
vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we 
loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently 
threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of 
the law that an immediate check is required to save the country.272 
 
Freedom of speech in the marketplace of ideas creates a “proving ground,”273 in 
which a “constant competitive interplay of ideas moves society more quickly 
toward a truthful understanding of the world.”274  
The other three primary rationales for safeguarding freedom of speech also 
serve an important role outside the sphere of public policy. The second rationale, 
safeguarding free speech for the purpose of realizing individual self-fulfillment, 
270 Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE 
L.J. 877, 878–79 (1963). 
271 See generally JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND 
RIVALRIES THAT DEFINED AMERICA 89–90, 113–14 (2006) (addressing Holmes attachment 
to a Social Darwinist view of the political process but opposition to constitutionalizing 
such an approach in economic liberties cases). 
272 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
273 David Horton, Testation and Speech, 101 GEO. L.J. 61, 91 (2012). 
274 Marin R. Scordato & Paula A. Monopoli, Free Speech Rationales After September 
11th: The First Amendment in Post-World Trade Center America, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 185, 194 (2002).  
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provides an essential method of self-expression.275 As noted by Justice Thurgood 
Marshall, “[t]he First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also 
those of the human spirit—a spirit that demands self-expression.”276 Under this 
approach, “truth of expression is irrelevant and secondary to the legal capability of 
[persons] to express [themselves] . . . .”277  
Third, in terms of the role of free speech in societal decision making, free 
speech enables communication of one’s judgments and creation of a culture and 
community, whether that is in the area of arts and literature, the sciences, or any 
other area of knowledge or communal association.278 In this vein, free speech plays 
a vital role in “decisionmaking on all social values.”279  
Finally, safeguarding free speech serves the purpose of balancing societal 
stability with change by providing a safety-valve release for those holding 
heterodox views.280 The safety-valve concept reflects a sense that freedom of 
speech takes the lid off the boiling pot, allowing steam to be released and avoiding 
more serious social unrest and violence that may follow from not having that 
release.281 In addition, this balancing of stability with change through avoiding 
suppression of heterodoxy maintains societal vitality against the tendency toward 
stagnation and rigidity that in the absence of such freedom threatens to ossify a 
society.282  
While political speech is at the core of the First Amendment,283 the protection 
of freedom of speech also serves other critical purposes as addressed above. Chief 
Justice Warren’s justification for the extension of the constitutional safeguards of 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to speech regarding public figures rested on the 
core self-governance purpose of the First Amendment. The extension of the actual 
malice standard to persons who are not engaged in influencing political questions 
but who are public figures with regard to other matters of public concern honors 
the broader purposes served by the First Amendment.284 This consistent 
application beyond the political realm constituted a necessary expansion in the 
understanding of what constitutes a public controversy. However, in embracing 
this broader understanding in state and lower-federal courts, the categorization 
structure created by Gertz has been further eroded. If public controversy is 
275 See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA 
L. REV. 964, 993–94 (1978). 
276 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
277 Hilary Schronce Blackwood, Regulating Student Cyberbullying, 40 RUTGERS L. 
REC. 153, 175 (2012–2013). 
278 Emerson, supra note 270, at 882–83. 
279 Lee C. Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values, 92 YALE L.J. 438, 471 
(1983). 
280 Emerson, supra note 270, at 884–86. 
281 See Scordato & Monopoli, supra note 274, at 199. 
282 Emerson, supra note 270, at 884–86. 
283 See Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central 
Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 208. 
284 See Schauer, supra note 138, at 931. 
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understood in terms of matters of public policy, it is much easier to understand 
whether a person has thrust herself into that arena. Where nonpolitical cultural, 
religious, sporting, and scientific matters, among others, can constitute a basis for a 
public controversy, it becomes exceedingly more difficult to discern when 
someone has thrust herself into that arena and thereby made herself a public figure 
because the multiplicity and variety thereof is extraordinary.  
 
C.  Erosion of the Lack of Media Access Rationale 
 
The chasm between private and public persons’ access to media and means 
for counteracting defamatory comments stood as one of the two central reasons the 
Gertz Court distinguished defamation plaintiffs into the categories of public and 
private persons and applied varying constitutional standards to these different types 
of plaintiffs.285 The Gertz Court reasoned, 
 
[t]he first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help—using 
available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and 
thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation. Public officials and 
public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels 
of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity 
to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy. 
Private individuals are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state 
interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater.286 
 
The change in access to channels of effective communication for an ordinary 
citizen from 1974 to 2014 has been extraordinary.287 While the enormity of the 
societal revolution that has occurred over the last four decades is difficult to fully 
comprehend, it can be gleaned that “the ability for self-help has spread to the 
masses.”288 Reflecting on the rapid advance of technologically-driven societal 
changes, Thomas Friedman observed that when he wrote The World is Flat, 
“Facebook didn’t exist for most people, ‘Twitter’ was still a sound, the ‘cloud’ was 
something in the sky, ‘3G’ was a parking space, ‘applications’ were what you sent 
285 SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 2:13, at 2-30 (“The Gertz compromise was grounded in 
two rationales reflecting the Supreme Court’s perceptions about the differences between 
public and private figures. The first of these rationales is the ‘access to the media’ 
argument.”). 
286 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974). 
287 See BRUCE A. SHUMAN, ISSUES FOR LIBRARIES AND INFORMATION SCIENCE IN THE 
INTERNET AGE, at x (2001) (asserting that the “rise of the Internet is one of the most 
astonishing developments of this or any other century, compared by some writers in 
importance to the capture of fire and to Gutenberg’s printing press”). 
288 Jeff Kosseff, Private or Public? Eliminating the Gertz Defamation Test, 2011 U. 
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 249, 266. 
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to college, and ‘Skype’ was a typo.”289 Friedman wrote The World Is Flat in 
2005;290 Gertz was decided in 1974. In “the mid-1970s, the media landscape was 
much more sparsely populated than it is today and consumers had far fewer 
choices.”291 In 1974, computers were still for governments, large corporations, and 
a few hobbyists.292 The internet was an unknown domain reserved for high science 
and the military.293 Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak would not develop their first 
mainstream computer, the Macintosh, for another ten years.294 Netscape would not 
offer the first non-techie Internet interface for another seventeen years.295 The first 
blog was twenty years away, and widespread blogging would not appear for 
twenty-five years.296 
In 1974 channels of communication were essentially confined to local 
newspapers, commercial radio stations, the big-three television networks, and 
national newsmagazines.297 The limited number and narrowness of control of 
289 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN & MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THAT USED TO BE US: HOW 
AMERICA FELL BEHIND IN THE WORLD IT INVENTED AND HOW WE CAN COME BACK 59 
(2011). 
290 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY (2005). 
291 DAVID CROTEAU & WILLIAM HOYNES, THE BUSINESS OF MEDIA: CORPORATE 
MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 111 (2d ed. 2006). 
292 See JANNA QUITNEY ANDERSON, IMAGINING THE INTERNET: PERSONALITIES, 
PREDICTIONS, PERSPECTIVES 39–42 (2005) (noting that computers were extremely 
expensive, most were so large they could fill an entire room, and many organizations 
“shared” time on a single computer). 
293 See MARY LOU ROBERTS & DEBRA ZAHAY, INTERNET MARKETING: INTEGRATING 
ONLINE & OFFLINE STRATEGIES 3–4 (3d ed. 2013). 
294 ROBERT J. CARBAUGH, CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS: AN APPLICATIONS 
APPROACH 103 (7th ed. 2014). 
295 Pamela Samuelson & Hal R. Varian, The “New Economy” and Information 
Technology Policy, in AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1990S 361, 365–66 (Jeffrey A. 
Frankel & Peter R. Orszag eds., 2002). 
296 ROB BROWN, PUBLIC RELATIONS AND THE SOCIAL WEB: HOW TO USE SOCIAL 
MEDIA AND WEB 2.0 IN COMMUNICATIONS 26 (2009). As Brown explains,  
 
[t]he first bloggers were . . . effectively online diarists, who would keep a 
running account of their lives. These blogs began well before the term was 
coined and the authors referred to themselves usually as diarists or online 
journalists. Perhaps the first of these and therefore the original blogger was 
Justin Hall, who began blogging in 1994. 
 
Id. Public participation in blogging started to significantly increase in 1999 with the 
appearance of Blogger, which was purchased by Google four years later. Id. 
297 See, e.g., RICHARD CAMPBELL ET AL., MEDIA & CULTURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
MASS COMMUNICATION G-8 (8th ed. 2013) (describing the mid-1950s through the late-
1970s as the network era for the dominance of the big three television networks: ABC, 
CBS, and NBC); Kevin Drum, A Blogger Says: Save The MSM!, Mother Jones, 
March/April 2007, available at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2007/03/blogger-says 
 
                                                          
988 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
media outlets “effectively thwart[ed] any popular participation in the press and 
commercial radio and television.”298 Things have changed dramatically. There has 
been a “wave of media democratization . . . with the popularization of the Internet, 
especially Web 2.0. . . . In contrast to [earlier] participation through the 
Internet . . . , [more recent] participation in the Internet focuses on the 
opportunities provided to non-media professionals to []produce media content 
themselves and to []organize the structures that allow for this media 
production.”299 While Web 2.0, which roughly dates to the year 2000, “is a 
slippery character to pin down,” the core thereof is technological services 
including “blogs, wikis, podcasts, Really Simple Syndication (RSS) feeds etc., 
which facilitate a more socially connected Web where everyone is able to add to 
and edit the information space.”300  
From young to old, rich to poor, this technological revolution has been 
embraced.301 As of December 2013, the Pew Research Internet Project found that 
73% of adults use social media, 71% use Facebook, 22% use LinkedIn, 21% use 
Pinterest, 18% use Twitter, and 17% use Instagram.302 People use social media as a 
“key source [of] news and information,”303 and an important forum for debate and 
discussion of public issues.304 While social media is ascending, traditional media is 
in sharp decline.305 In 1964, the year New York Times Co. v. Sullivan was decided, 
-save-msm, archived at http://perma.cc/E343-H5JY (stating that in the early- to mid-1970s 
“most people still had pretty limited access to news . . . one or two newspapers, three TV 
networks, and a few national newsmagazines”). 
298 Nico Carpentier et al., Waves of Media Democratization: A Brief History of 
Contemporary Participatory Practices in the Media Sphere, 19 CONVERGENCE: INT’L J. 
RES. INTO NEW MEDIA TECHS. 287, 291 (2013). 
299 Id. at 292; see also David Lat & Zach Shemtob, Public Figurehood in the Digital 
Age, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 403, 410 (2011) (noting that in the mid-1970s “false 
charges could only be countered through access to a printing press, radio station, or 
television network—modes of communication that ordinary citizens generally could not tap 
into”). 
300 PAUL ANDERSON, WEB 2.0 AND BEYOND: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNOLOGIES 1 
(2012). 
301 See Social Networking Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/M2R-ENCX (last visited Sept. 27, 2014). The study found that 65% of 
persons fifty to sixty-four years of age used social media—that number is even higher for 
younger age groups—and social media usage only had minor fluctuation by household 
income level with slightly higher use at the lowest income level. Id. 
302 See MAEVE DUGGAN & AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., SOCIAL MEDIA 
UPDATE 2013, at 1 (2013), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2013/12/PIP_Soci 
al-Networking-2013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7KFE-WVHK.  
303 Alan B. Albarran, Preface to THE SOCIAL MEDIA INDUSTRIES, at xix (Alan B. 
Albarran ed., 2013). 
304 Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 2003–04 (2011). 
305 THE CONCISE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 58 
(Michael Kazin et al. eds., 2011). 
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81% of Americans read a daily print newspaper.306 As of 2012, only 23% of 
Americans did so.307 The Internet has now become the main source for news for 
those under the age of fifty and is only second behind television for all Americans, 
well ahead of newspaper and radio usage.308 Seeking to survive the onslaught, 
traditional media outlets are adapting.309 Newspapers and magazines have opened 
news stories to comments from the public310 and created forums for citizen 
journalism.311 With editorial controls loosening, newspapers and magazines have 
also adopted more accommodating approaches to corrections, which have become 
a more effective mechanism for obtaining self-help.312 Some websites have even 
created formal right-of-reply features allowing aggrieved parties to set the record 
straight.313  
306 HERMANN SIMON, BEAT THE CRISIS: 33 QUICK SOLUTIONS FOR YOUR COMPANY 
13 (2010). 
307 Number of Americans Who Read Print Newspapers Continues Decline, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/number-of-am 
ericans-who-read-print-newspapers-continues-decline/, archived at http://perma.cc/5DAZ-
AB97. 
308 PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, AMID CRITICISM, SUPPORT 
FOR MEDIA’S ‘WATCHDOG’ ROLE STANDS OUT 10–11 (2013), available at http://www.peo 
ple-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/8-8-2013%20Media%20Attitudes%20Release.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/TJ4W-LSQF. 
309 See Dina A. Ibrahim, Broadcasting and Cable Networks, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
SOCIAL NETWORKS 89, 90–92 (George A. Barnett ed., 2011). 
310 See Paul Grabowicz, The Transition to Digital Journalism, KDMCBERKELEY (July 
23, 2014), http://multimedia.journalism.berkeley.edu/tutorials/digital-transform/comments-
on-news-stories/, archived at http://perma.cc/5VPB-C9CW (noting that “[o]ne of the most 
basic ways that a news organization can engage people is to provide a way for them to 
comment on and discuss news stories on the website and postings to staff weblogs”). 
311 See, e.g., Citizen Journalism, Mediashift, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/soci 
al-media/citizen-journalism/, archived at http://perma.cc/57QG-ZQL7 (last visited July 10, 
2014) (providing internet links for individuals to act as citizen journalists regarding current 
national and international topics). 
312 See Kosseff, supra note 288, at 266–67. 
313 See Jamie Lund, Managing Your Online Identity, J. INTERNET L., May 2012, at 3, 
5 (“A good example of this type of ‘right of reply’ is found on RateMyProfessors.com. The 
content from RateMyProfessors.com is generated by students commenting on the 
performance of their professors based on various criteria, including easiness, clarity, and 
helpfulness. The purpose of the site is to allow students to vent or to make endorsements to 
would-be students about various professors. The site is consequently a receptacle for both 
insults and praise. To promote an open dialogue, the site allows professors to rebut any 
particular statement posted about them, with those rebuttals then published in conjunction 
with the original student comments. In this way, RateMyProfessors.com allows for 
correction of misinformation with minimum administrative oversight. Right-of-reply 
websites are models for other sites in that they have managed to allow for uninhibited 
freedom of expression while also providing a meaningful means of correcting false 
statements without requiring costly administrative expenditures by the site owners.” 
(citations omitted)). 
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The cumulative effect of the advances in technology and social media is 
extraordinary and would have been unthinkable to the members of the Supreme 
Court in 1974. In 2014, “ordinary people can now publish their thoughts on 
Twitter . . . attack those in power on Blogger . . . and report on events excluded 
from other mainstream media by sending their own news stories and photos to 
citizen journalism sites like Demotix.”314 Through their online engagement, 
ordinary people have “the opportunity to share their experiences (good and bad), 
air their views and opinions, and vent their frustrations.”315 Not only can ordinary 
people communicate, but they are also able to do so with a vast potential 
audience316 and at an extremely low cost.317 Professors Andrea Press and Bruce 
Williams have observed that “new media . . . challenges elites . . . by providing 
communication channels for ordinary citizens to directly produce and access 
information about political, social, and economic life.”318 Technological changes 
314 KEN BROWNE, AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY 324 (4th ed. 2011). 
315 TERRY NICKLIN, CAMBRIDGE MARKETING HANDBOOK: STAKEHOLDER 58 (2013). 
316 See BROWNE, supra note 314, at 324; Michelle Sherman, The Anatomy of a Trial 
with Social Media and the Internet, J. INTERNET L., May 2011, at 1, 1 (stating that “[s]ocial 
media is connection. It is communication, a rather unlimited form of it with people 
speaking to a large audience.”); Aaron Perzanowski, Comment, Relative Access to 
Corrective Speech: A New Test for Requiring Actual Malice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 833, 835 
(2006) (noting that “[t]he average citizen—previously confined to the one-to-one methods 
of distributing information—enjoys a potential global audience on the internet”). 
317 See Geoffrey W.G. Leane, Deliberative Democracy and the Internet: New 
Possibilities for Legitimising Law Through Public Discourse?, 23 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 373, 
379–80 (2010); Stephen C. Jacques, Comment, Reno v. ACLU: Insulating the Internet, the 
First Amendment, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1945, 1989 (1997) 
(observing that “[t]he Internet . . . breaks down . . . barriers, offering an egalitarian form of 
communication where the cost is little or nothing and an opinion is instantaneously 
distributed worldwide”). In contrast, media of the Gertz era required enormous capital 
investment; for example, printing and distributing newspapers required substantial 
expenditures including printing presses, delivery trucks and delivery persons, reporters, 
editors, assistants, etc. See SHANNON E. MARTIN & KATHLEEN A. HANSEN, NEWSPAPERS 
OF RECORD IN A DIGITAL AGE: FROM HOT TYPE TO HOT LINK 44 (1998). 
318 ANDREA L. PRESS &  BRUCE A. WILLIAMS, THE NEW MEDIA ENVIRONMENT: AN 
INTRODUCTION 20 (2010); see also Dan Gillmor, Bloggers Breaking Ground in 
Communication, EJOURNAL USA GLOBAL ISSUES, March 2006, at 24, 24 (“Software 
technology that allows writers to easily post their own essays on the World Wide Web has 
challenged the traditional role of media organizations as gatekeepers to a mass audience. At 
a steadily increasing pace over the last several years, ordinary citizens have made 
themselves into reporters and commentators on the social scene. They have made a 
remarkably rapid ascent onto their own platform in the realm of social and political 
debate.”). Conservative political commentator Hugh Hewitt has argued that “[t]he power of 
elites to determine what [is] news via a tightly controlled dissemination system [has been] 
shattered. The ability and authority to distribute text are now truly democratized.” HUGH 
HEWITT, BLOG: UNDERSTANDING THE INFORMATION REFORMATION THAT’S CHANGING 
YOUR WORLD 70–71 (2005); cf. David Gauntlett, Creativity and Digital Innovation, in 
DIGITAL WORLD: CONNECTIVITY, CREATIVITY AND RIGHTS 77, 80 (Gillian Youngs ed., 
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have given rise to a democratization of the means of media production and the 
manner in which information is obtained, and this has greatly empowered the 
ordinary person.319 New-media bloggers are in fact now holding the traditional 
institutional news media accountable for errors.320  
This new reality has not gone entirely unnoticed by courts. For example, the 
Delaware Supreme Court observed that ordinary persons now have available 
 
a very powerful form of extrajudicial relief. The internet provides a 
means of communication where a person wronged by statements of an 
anonymous poster can respond instantly, can respond to the allegedly 
defamatory statements on the same site or blog, and thus, can, almost 
contemporaneously, respond to the same audience that initially read the 
allegedly defamatory statements. The [person] can thereby easily correct 
any misstatements or falsehoods, respond to character attacks, and 
generally set the record straight. This unique feature of internet 
communications allows a potential plaintiff ready access to mitigate the 
harm, if any, he has suffered to his reputation as a result of an 
anonymous defendant’s allegedly defamatory statements made on an 
internet blog or in a chat room.321 
 
Similarly, the Georgia Supreme Court, in adopting a broad interpretation for 
statutory protection for online speech, observed a policy of encouraging 
“defamation victims to seek self-help, their first remedy, by ‘using available 
opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize its 
adverse impact on reputation.’”322 In doing so, the Georgia Supreme Court 
indicated that it was “strik[ing] a balance in favor of ‘uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open’ debate in an age of communications when ‘anyone, anywhere in the 
world, with access to the Internet’ can address a worldwide audience of readers in 
cyberspace.”323  
2013) (addressing the shift in perception of media as wholly separate and above the masses 
with the empowerment of the ordinary person to reach mass audiences through 
technology). 
319 DAVID TAYLOR & DAVID MILES, FUSION: THE NEW WAY OF MARKETING 11 
(2011); cf. CARNE ROSS, THE LEADERLESS REVOLUTION: HOW ORDINARY PEOPLE WILL 
TAKE POWER AND CHANGE POLITICS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, at xvii (2011) 
(declaring that “in an increasingly interconnected system, such as the world emerging in 
the twenty-first century, the action of one individual or a small group can affect the whole 
system very rapidly”). 
320 S. Robert Lichter, The Media, in UNDERSTANDING AMERICA: THE ANATOMY OF 
AN EXCEPTIONAL NATION 181, 215 (Peter H. Schuck & James Q. Wilson eds., 2008). 
321 Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 464 (Del. 2005). 
322 Mathis v. Cannon, 573 S.E.2d 376, 385 (Ga. 2002) (quoting Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974)). 
323 Id. at 386 (citations omitted). 
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Congress has similarly looked to self-help as an appropriate remedy. In 
enacting the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), Congress found that 
“[t]he Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true 
diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and 
myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”324 Congress also found “[t]he Internet 
and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all 
Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.”325 Among other 
objectives of the CDA, Congress sought “to promote the continued development of 
the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media 
[and] to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for 
the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation.”326 To serve these ends, Congress passed a measure ensuring that “[n]o 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher 
or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”327 As a practical consequence, this leaves available the remedy of online 
self-help, a remedy that Congress has found appropriate.328  
Extra-legal solutions are also available through the emergence of private 
companies offering online reputation management tools. For example, 
Reputation.com, also known as Reputation Defender, has embraced facilitating 
control for individuals and businesses over their online appearance as its corporate 
mission.329 To achieve this end, such entities can monitor online commentary, 
boost positive comments in search engine ranking returns while lowering negative 
comments, and scrub negative comments by having them removed.330 This 
approach offers certain advantages over defamation suits including eliminating 
defamatory statements and avoiding drawing additional attention to the defamatory 
material.331 
324 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (2012). 
325 Id. § 230(a)(4). 
326 Id. § 230(b)(1), (2). 
327 Id. § 230(c)(1). 
328 See Angelotti, supra note 207, at 485; Allison E. Horton, Note, Beyond Control?: 
The Rise and Fall of Defamation Regulation on the Internet, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1265, 
1305–06 (2009). 
329 Search Results, REPUTATION.COM, http://www.reputation.com/reputationdefender, 
archived at http://perma.cc/D4W8-L5NG (last visited Aug. 14, 2014).  
330 See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn from 
John Doe?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1373, 1390 (2009). See generally Angelotti, supra note 207, at 
495 (describing some of the means by which such companies accomplish their objectives 
on behalf of their clients). 
331 See Lidsky, supra note 330, at 1390. Professor Jacqueline Lipton also notes, 
 
These services provide a number of advantages over legal solutions to 
online abuses, including the fact that several of them now have many years of 
experience with reputation management and have established solid working 
relationships with websites that host harmful communications. The use of 
private commercial services does not raise the specter of a First Amendment 
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Though the Supreme Court has not addressed the availability of technological 
tools in the context of defamation, the availability of self-help technology services, 
as opposed to legally imposed restrictions on speech, has proven relevant to the 
Court’s analysis of other free speech issues. For example, addressing decency- 
related restrictions, the Court expressly indicated “the mere possibility that user-
based Internet screening software would ‘soon be widely available’ was relevant to 
our rejection of an overbroad restriction of indecent cyberspeech.”332 The litigation 
strategy from those aiming to invalidate restrictions imposed by the CDA was 
squarely focused on the availability of self-help remedies provided by 
technological services and, thus, on the reduced need for governmentally imposed 
speech restrictions.333 As Professor Ann Bartow observed, that was precisely 
where the Justices turned in analyzing the constitutionality of the decency 
restrictions imposed by Congress, noting  
 
a remedy was available for parents who did not want their children 
exposed to pornography or “indecency” on the Internet. They could 
purchase filtering software (a.k.a. “censorware”) and subscribe to related 
content filtering services to keep undesired words and images away from 
their computers. In this way they could accomplish with their private 
purchasing power what the government would not do for them in terms 
of providing tools to regulate the information that was accessible to their 
children.334 
 
Addressing a free speech issue, though not defamation, nearly two decades 
ago when internet usage was at a stage of comparative infancy, the U.S. Supreme 
Court observed that “[t]hrough the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line 
challenge. . . . [M]any laws directed at curtailing online speech may raise First 
Amendment concerns and may be open to constitutional challenge. Reputation 
management services also avoid many of the practical problems associated with 
litigation including jurisdictional challenges and difficulties identifying a 
defendant in the first place. A commercial service does not need to identify or 
locate a potential defendant in order to engage in astroturfing or search engine 
optimization. Resort to a reputation management service also avoids drawing 
public attention to the damaging content. Harmful content can simply be 
unobtrusively de-prioritized in search engine results. 
 
Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1103, 
1147 (2011) (citations omitted). 
332 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000) (quoting 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 876–77 (1997)).  
333 See generally Tom W. Bell, Pornography, Privacy, and Digital Self Help, 19 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 133, 138–42 (2000) (describing how self-help 
remedies have made certain legislative restrictions on speech that is indecent or harmful to 
minors unnecessary and unconstitutional). 
334 Ann Bartow, Internet Defamation as Profit Center: The Monetization of Online 
Harassment, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 383, 422 (2009) (citations omitted). 
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can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any 
soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the 
same individual can become a pamphleteer.”335 The empowerment of ordinary 
citizens has grown exponentially in the last two decades, fundamentally 
undermining the Gertz notion that private persons do not have meaningful access 
to channels of communication for redressing attacks on their reputations.  
 
D.  Erosion of the Voluntariness Rationale 
 
While the lack of access to channels of communication in 1974 influenced the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in distinguishing public and private persons, the heart 
of the Gertz Court’s division of limited-purpose public figures from private 
individuals was voluntariness.336 The Gertz Court envisioned public figures as 
persons “thrust[ing] themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies 
in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved” and in doing so 
“assum[ing] roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society.”337 Such a 
person “voluntarily injects himself . . . into a particular public controversy.”338 The 
concept of an involuntary public figure stands in sharp contradistinction with 
“[w]ords and phrases such as ‘thrust’ . . . and ‘in order to influence the resolution 
of the issues.’”339 
However, “[w]hat is and is not voluntary is by no means self-evident.”340 And 
what is declared by courts to be voluntary looks increasingly less limited to 
persons thrusting themselves into matters of public controversies in order to 
influence the resolution thereof. Professor Smolla’s explanation of the application 
of public figure status to athletes is revealing on this point: 
 
Professional athletes voluntarily enter the “arena,” quite literally the 
“sports arena,” and issues germane to their performance or fitness, 
including issues relating to mental and physical health, but also to their 
character and position in society as role models, justify treating 
professional athletes as public figures and also justifies a reasonably 
broad understanding of the range of issues concerning the professional 
athlete’s life that falls within the perimeter of that public figure status.341 
335 Reno, 521 U.S. at 870. 
336 Hopkins, supra note 217, at 19 (noting that “voluntariness seemed to be the key 
element in determining whether a libel plaintiff is a public figure”). Questions have been 
raised, however, about the soundness of the voluntariness rationale. See, e.g., Anderson, 
supra note 246, at 527–30 (listing a number of reasons why public figures may not have 
voluntarily thrust themselves into the public eye, thereby undermining the voluntariness 
rationale). 
337 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). 
338 Id. at 351. 
339 SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 2:33, at 2-64.12 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345). 
340 Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 684, 703 (D.N.J. 1985). 
341 SMOLLA, supra note 213, § 6:40, at 6-361. 
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Professional athletes have entered an arena that attracts considerable public 
attention, but professional athletes have not “thrust” themselves to “the forefront of 
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues 
involved.”342 Instead, the voluntariness aspect derives from entering into a 
profession that “command[s] the attention of sports fans.”343 With this transition, 
even the voice shifts in a number of judicial opinions from active to passive. For 
example, in determining whether a plaintiff, a professional football player, was a 
public figure, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded, “Chuy had been 
thrust into public prominence.”344 
The concept even extends to individuals who scrupulously endeavor to 
maintain their anonymity and privacy and to avoid the public sphere. While noting 
that the Mafioso figure in the case before it “yearns for [the] shadow,” the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, nevertheless, found him to be a public figure because, by 
being a Mafioso, he “voluntarily engaged in a course that was bound to invite 
attention and comment.”345 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals embraced the same 
understanding, concluding that “[w]hen an individual undertakes a course of 
conduct that invites attention, even though such attention is neither sought nor 
desired, he may be deemed a public figure.”346 In other words, “‘[v]oluntariness,’ 
for purposes of public figure status, could be involuntary.”347 The underlying 
analysis of this less demanding form of voluntariness emphasizes “‘run[ning] the 
risks’ and ‘rais[ing] the chances’ of becoming a news item.”348 Pursuant to such an 
approach, as noted by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, “courts have classified 
some people as limited purpose public figures because of their status, position or 
associations.”349 Such an approach is readily susceptible to the criticism that “[t]he 
premise that public figures have voluntarily accepted the risk of defamation, or that 
it goes with the territory, is nothing more than a handy fiction.”350  
Changes in technology and media make utilizing this form of analysis, which 
lowers the bar for voluntariness, especially problematic. Professor Gerald 
Ashdown has observed, 
 
[i]n our highly mobile, visible, and interactive society, the risk of 
attracting the attention of the press is as apparent as it is unpredictable. 
342 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. 
343 Chuy v. Phila. Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1280 (3d Cir. 1979). 
344 Id. (emphasis added). 
345 Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., 580 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting 
Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., 411 F. Supp. 440, 445 (S.D. Ga. 1976)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
346 McDowell v. Paiewonsky, 769 F.2d 942, 949 (3d Cir. 1985). 
347 Hopkins, supra note 217, at 24. 
348 King, supra note 6, at 692 (alterations in original) (quoting Clyburn v. News 
World Commc’ns, Inc., 903 F.2d 29, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 
349 Marcone v. Penthouse Int’l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1083 (3d Cir. 
1985). 
350 King, supra note 6, at 698. 
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Becoming involved in any number of events, whether voluntarily or 
involuntarily, e.g., from an accident, natural disaster to a winning lottery 
ticket (i.e., good luck or bad), makes us vulnerable to media exposure.351 
 
Accordingly, voluntariness is no longer confined to individuals who thrust 
themselves into the vortex of a public controversy to try to influence the resolution 
of the matter in controversy.352 Instead voluntariness can be satisfied by a less 
351 Gerald G. Ashdown, Journalism Police, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 739, 757 (2006). 
352 See, e.g., McDowell v. Paiewonsky, 769 F.2d 942, 949 (3d Cir. 1985); Marcone, 
754 F.2d at 1083; Chuy v. Phila. Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1280 (3d Cir. 
1979); Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., 580 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 1978); see also, e.g., 
Lohrenz v. Donnelly, 350 F.3d 1272, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“Because Lohrenz’s evidence 
shows that she chose the F-14 combat jet while well aware of the public controversy over 
women in combat roles, her challenge to the ruling that she was a voluntary limited-
purpose public figure once the Navy assigned her to the F-14 combat aircraft rings hollow: 
she chose combat training in the F-14 and when, as a result of that choice, she became one 
of the first two women combat pilots, a central role in the public controversy came with the 
territory. Having assumed the risk when she chose combat jets that she would in fact 
receive a combat assignment, Lt. Lohrenz attained a position of special prominence in the 
controversy when she ‘suited up’ as an F-14 combat pilot.”); Clyburn v. News World 
Commc’ns, Inc., 903 F.2d 29, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Clyburn’s acts before any controversy 
arose put him at its center. His consulting firm had numerous contracts with the District 
government, he had many social contacts with administration officials, and Medina, at least 
as one may judge from attendance at her funeral, also enjoyed such ties. Clyburn also spent 
the night of Medina’s collapse in her company. One may hobnob with high officials 
without becoming a public figure, but one who does so runs the risk that personal tragedies 
that for less well-connected people would pass unnoticed may place him at the heart of a 
public controversy. Clyburn engaged in conduct that he knew markedly raised the chances 
that he would become embroiled in a public controversy. This conduct, together with his 
false statements at the controversy’s outset, disable him from claiming the protections of a 
purely ‘private’ person.”); Dombey v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 724 P.2d 562, 570−71 
(Ariz. 1986) (“Dombey sought, received, accepted and struggled to keep appointments as 
the designated insurance agent of record for a large county and administrator of deferred 
compensation programs for its employees. While he was not employed by and received no 
direct benefits from the public body, he did receive significant and valuable benefits 
because of his position. He did more than compile and transmit research results or publish 
arcana in obscure learned journals; he made recommendations resulting in substantial 
expenditures from the public fisc for health and life insurance programs and of private 
funds obtained by payroll deductions from public employees for the deferred compensation 
program. By assuming the position that he held, Dombey invited public scrutiny and 
should have expected that the manner in which he performed his duties would be a 
legitimate matter of public concern, exposing him to public and media attention. This is not 
to say that every provider of goods and services to the government becomes a public figure. 
We believe that no bright line can be drawn. A person who sells legal pads to the judicial 
department may legitimately expect to retain almost complete anonymity. Those 
responsible for providing rockets for the space program may not legitimately enjoy the 
same expectations. Dombey is at neither pole, but we believe that by assuming the 
positions of agent of record and administrator for the deferred compensation plans, he 
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demanding showing that plaintiffs willingly engaged in activity that foreseeably 
put them at risk of public attention. Part of the pressure resulting in lowering the 
bar of what constitutes voluntariness arises from courts avoiding the involuntary 
public figure category.353 Instead of developing the involuntary public figure 
category, courts have repeatedly stretched their understanding of what constitutes 
voluntariness to such an extent that they create what Professor Joseph King has 
termed “stealth involuntary public figure[s].”354  
 
E.  Devolving of the Private Individual 
 
First in his plurality opinion in Rosenbloom and subsequently in his dissenting 
opinion in Gertz, Justice Brennan observed that “[v]oluntarily or not, we are all 
‘public’ men to some degree.”355 Justice Brennan did not find agreement from a 
sufficient number of his colleagues to form a majority around this conclusion. 
David Lat, founder of the website Above the Law, and Professor Zach Shemtob 
have argued that “Justice Brennan’s words ring even more true in the digital 
age.”356  
Private individuals are certainly less private today than they were in 1974. 
And for that, as Cassius proclaims to Brutus in William Shakespeare’s Julius 
Caesar, “[t]he fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars. But in ourselves.”357 Judge 
Alex Kozinski has raised a steady drumbeat for the proposition that the ordinary 
person’s love affair with technology is killing privacy:358 
 
It started with the supermarket loyalty programs. They seemed 
innocuous enough—you just scribble down your name, number and 
address in exchange for a plastic card and a discount on Oreos. . . .  
. . . Letting stores track our purchases may not appear to be 
permitting an intensely personal revelation but, as the saying goes, you 
surrendered any legitimate expectation of anonymity with regard to the manner in which he 
performed in his positions, his relationship with executives of the governmental agencies 
and the other matters with which the articles were concerned. . . . Whatever requirement 
there might be to ‘thrust’ oneself into a public controversy was satisfied by his voluntary 
participation in activity calculated to lead to public scrutiny.” (citations omitted)). 
353 See King, supra note 6, at 688–93. 
354 Id. at 688. 
355 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971); Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 364 (1974). 
356 Lat & Shemtob, supra note 299, at 413. 
357 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 1, sc. 2, ll. 141−42, at 172 (David 
Daniell ed., 1998). 
358 See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Eric S. Nguyen, Has Technology Killed the Fourth 
Amendment?, 2011–2012 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 15, 15; Alex Kozinski & Stephanie Grace, 
Pulling Plug on Privacy: How Technology Helped Make the 4th Amendment Obsolete, THE 
DAILY (June 22, 2011), available at http://www.law.utah.edu/wp-content/uploads/Week 
Twelve-Pulling.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4NKT-GDK4. 
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are what you eat, and we inevitably reveal more than we thought. Have 
diapers in your cart? You probably have a baby. Tofu? Probably a 
vegetarian. A case of Muscatel a week? An alcoholic (with poor taste, at 
that). The cards also track the “where” and “when” of our shopping 
expeditions. Making a late-night run to a convenience store near your ex-
girlfriend’s house? Buying posters and markers the day before a political 
rally? If you swiped your card, all that information is now public. . . .  
. . . These cards were just the beginning. Fast Track passes quickly 
followed—with their lure of a shorter commute for a little privacy. Then 
came eBay and Amazon, which save us from retyping our billing and 
shipping information, if only we create an account. Before long, 
convenience became paramount, and electronic tracking became the 
norm. Nowadays, Google not only collects data on what websites we 
visit but uses its satellites to take pictures of our homes.359  
 
Additionally, much of what was formerly squirreled away in a government records 
office is now readily available online.360 For instance, a nosy neighbor can 
discover how much one paid for their home in only a moment on Zillow.361 A little 
more work and arrest records, professional licenses, property liens, trademarks, 
patents, driver’s license information, and bankruptcy history, among other things, 
are all readily available.362  
Social media reduces the private sphere even further. In 2008, the editors of 
Webster’s New World Dictionary chose “overshare,” which they defined as “to 
divulge excessive personal information,” as their word of the year.363 There exists 
a common and pronounced tendency to overshare on social media.364 Professor 
Bruce Boyden has observed that “[t]oo many people, confronted with the ability to 
share information with others via social networks, readily avail themselves of that 
opportunity, causing personal information to be shared from Facebook or Twitter 
359 Kozinski & Grace, supra note 358, at 15. 
360 HERMAN T. TAVANI, ETHICS AND TECHNOLOGY: ETHICAL ISSUES IN AN AGE OF 
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 138 (2004). 
361 David Carlson, How Zillow Fueled My Real Estate Obsession, YOUNG ADULT 
MONEY (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.youngadultmoney.com/2012/10/15/how-zillow-fueled 
-my-real-estate-obsession/, archived at http://perma.cc/AY66-P62A (noting that “[m]uch to 
the shock of some people that the price they paid for their home is on public record, Zillow 
aggregates this public record data and makes it easy to see what a home was sold for in the 
past.”). 
362 How to Find Free Public Records Online, ABOUT.COM, http://websearch.about. 
com/od/governmentpubliclegal/, archived at http://perma.cc/42SS-T44U (last visited Aug. 
15, 2014). 
363 Word of the Year 2008: Overshare, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD WORD OF THE YEAR 
(Dec. 1, 2008, 6:31 AM), http://wordoftheyear.wordpress.com/2008/12/01/2008-word-of-t 
he-year-overshare/, archived at http://perma.cc/GDQ7-NY8P.  
364 See Jennifer Rowsell, My Life on Facebook: Assessing the Art of Online Social 
Networking, in ASSESSING NEW LITERACIES: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE CLASSROOM 95, 97–
98 (Anne Burke & Roberta F. Hammett eds., 2009).  
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accounts with little care as to its relevance or privacy.”365 Through social media, 
ordinary individuals increasingly document almost every aspect of their lives.366 
Neuroscience analysis helps to explain some of this oversharing, suggesting that 
disclosure itself, especially personal self-disclosure, functions as an intrinsic 
reward, stimulating regions of the brain associated therewith.367 Communications 
and media studies scholars also have observed that computer-mediated 
communication eliminates social and biological cues that would signal restraint 
and instead make the Internet not “feel public to its users” thereby fostering less 
restricted communication.368 Seeking to restrain this epidemic of oversharing, a 
cottage industry of writers caution against oversharing369 and offer advice on 
where to draw the line.370  
Nevertheless, oversharing has arguably become a new socially accepted norm 
in which the non-over-sharer is the outlier.371 Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg has 
argued that open sharing of information, not preservation of traditional privacy, is 
the new social norm.372 It is difficult to argue with the conclusion that there has 
been a radical redefinition of social norms at least insofar as people “are freely 
giving up some of their privacy to strangers, as they willingly friend strangers and 
365 Bruce E. Boyden, Oversharing: Facebook Discovery and the Unbearable 
Sameness of Internet Law, 65 ARK. L. REV. 39, 39 (2012). 
366 Id. at 40. 
367 See Diana I. Tamir & Jason P. Mitchell, Disclosing Information about the Self is 
Intrinsically Rewarding, PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM., May 22, 2012, at 8038, 8038. 
368 Malin Sveningsson Elm et al., Question 3: How Do Various Notions of Privacy 
Influence Decisions in Qualitative Internet Research?, in INTERNET INQUIRY: 
CONVERSATIONS ABOUT METHOD 69, 77 (Annette N. Markham & Nancy K. Baym eds., 
2009) (emphasis omitted). 
369 See, e.g., Andy O’Donnell, The Dangers of Facebook Oversharing, ABOUT.COM 
http://netsecurity.about.com/od/securityadvisorie1/a/The-Dangers-Of-Facebook-Oversharin 
g.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/H3U8-8746 (last visited Aug. 15, 2014) (noting the 
value of oversharing to stalkers and lawyers); Robert Siciliano, Oversharing on Social 
Media Common Amongst 50+, MCAFEE BLOG CENTRAL (Oct. 23, 2013), http://blogs.mcaf 
ee.com/consumer/50plus-tech-savvy-but-still-at-risk, archived at http://perma.cc/UT4F-
PJRD. 
370 See, e.g., Amy Guth, Social Media and Oversharing: How to Check Yourself 
Before You Wreck Yourself (Online), CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 31, 2013), http://articles.chicagotrib 
une.com/2013-01-31/features/ct-tribu-social-media-oversharing-20130131_1_social-media 
-tweet-or-post-online-boundaries, archived at http://perma.cc/5ZDP-5VWJ; Mary Dell 
Harrington & Lisa Endlich Heffernan, Oversharing: Why Do We Do It and How Do We 
Stop?, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 4, 2013, 1:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/grown-
and-flown/oversharing-why-do-we-do-it-and-how-do-we-stop_b_4378997.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/DEF2-3LWM. 
371 See Natalie J. Ferrall, Comment, Concerted Activity and Social Media: Why 
Facebook is Nothing Like the Proverbial Water Cooler, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1001, 1026–27 
(2013). 
372 Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says Facebook Founder, 
GUARDIAN.COM (Jan. 10, 2010, 10:58 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/ 
jan/11/facebook-privacy, archived at http://perma.cc/E378-7C7F. 
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post information and images they would never have shared so publicly before.”373 
In selecting “overshare” as their word of the year, Websters’s editors were quite 
conscious of this duality:  
 
It’s also a word that is rather slip-slippery, chameleon-like. Some 
people use it disparagingly; they don’t like oversharing. Others think 
oversharing is good and that one must give full disclosure of one’s inner 
life. Sometimes there is a generational shift in the way people look at this 
practice and therefore view the word.374  
 
Even if an individual is cautious about sharing information online, a friend, a 
parent, an acquaintance, a neighbor, or any other person one interacts with may be 
far less hesitant about sharing or oversharing what formerly would have been 
private information about another person.375 And in this new era of social media, 
“friend” is a far more expansive concept and less-known commodity, a problem 
only magnified by unfathomable expansion online of the concept of a “friend of a 
friend.”376  
Furthermore, even among the most active and adept users of technology, there 
is little understanding of what is being made publicly available through their online 
activities.377 Such lack of knowledge, or at least full appreciation thereof, can 
result in even classically private information such as what one is reading becoming 
exposed through Internet connectivity programs such as Facebook’s social 
reader.378  
Technology poses an even greater threat by taking pieces of information and 
enabling aggregation of massive amounts of data about formerly private 
individuals that can then be made readily accessible.379 “[W]ith the advent of more 
373 Laurie Thomas Lee, Privacy and Social Media, in THE SOCIAL MEDIA INDUSTRIES 
146, 150 (Alan B. Albarran ed., 2013). 
374 Word of the Year 2008: Overshare, supra note 363. 
375 FREDERICK S. LANE, AMERICAN PRIVACY: THE 400-YEAR HISTORY OF OUR MOST 
CONTESTED RIGHT 255−61 (2009). 
376 See generally DOUGLAS JACOBSON & JOSEPH IDZIOREK, COMPUTER SECURITY 
LITERACY: STAYING SAFE IN A DIGITAL WORLD 214–17 (2012) (discussing the concept of 
“friend” in the digital world as it relates to varying levels of access to private information). 
377 See JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST 
GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 66–68 (2008). 
378 Margot Kaminski, Reading Over Your Shoulder: Social Readers and Privacy Law, 
2 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 13, 13 (2012). “Websites are adopting techniques to glean 
information about visitors to their sites, in real time, and then deliver different versions of 
the Web to different people.” Jennifer Valentino-DeVries et al., Websites Vary Prices, 
Deals Based on Users’ Information, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 24, 2012), http://online. 
wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323777204578189391813881534, archived at 
http://perma.cc/4NKQ-D367. Websites’ prices and text displays vary to respond to the 
customer’s IP address, search history, and means of accessing the site. Id.  
379 LORI ANDREWS, I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT YOU DID: SOCIAL 
NETWORKS AND THE DEATH OF PRIVACY 118−19 (2012); Craig Blakeley & Jeff Matsuura, 
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powerful data mining techniques, the aggregation of seemingly innocuous personal 
data across a range of social media makes it fairly straightforward to put together a 
disturbingly detailed profile of the data’s originator.”380 The access to information 
through aggregation and data mining is fundamentally undermining what was 
formerly the private sphere.381 Sun Microsystems Chief Executive Officer Scott 
McNealy indelicately declared: “You have zero privacy. Get over it.”382 At the 
very least, technology and people’s use of that technology has resulted in private 
individuals in 2014 being significantly less private than they were in 1974.  
 
IV.  GERTZ’S ENDURING PURPOSES 
 
While the sandcastle of Gertz has been battered by waves of First Amendment 
pressures and technological changes, it still stands, not yet having been subsumed 
back into the earth. While the edifice may someday be fully washed away, that day 
has not yet arrived. Gertz still serves important purposes, especially with regard to 
protecting the interests of private individuals harmed by media coverage. 
Welcome to the World of Information Aggregation, LEGAL SOLUTIONS BLOG (Feb. 13, 
2012), http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/law-and-techology/welcome-to-the-w 
orld-of-information-aggregation/, archived at http://perma.cc/EC3G-N6AL; Andre Oboler 
et al., The Danger of Big Data: Social Media as Computational Social Science, FIRST 
MONDAY (July 2, 2012), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3993/3269, 
archived at http://perma.cc/P9JS-K6UD.  
380 Lynne Y. Williams, Who is the ‘Virtual’ You and Do You Know Who is Watching 
You?, in SOCIAL MEDIA FOR ACADEMICS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 175, 177–78 (Diane 
Rasmussen Neal ed., 2012). 
381 See Saby Ghoshray, The Emerging Reality of Social Media: Erosion of Individual 
Privacy Through Cyber-Vetting and Law’s Inability to Catch Up, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 551, 556–65 (2013). Reflecting upon the new realities, a New York state 
court observed: 
 
[W]hen Plaintiff created her Facebook and MySpace accounts, she consented to 
the fact that her personal information would be shared with others, 
notwithstanding her privacy settings. Indeed, that is the very nature and purpose 
of these social networking sites else they would cease to exist. Since Plaintiff 
knew that her information may become publicly available, she cannot now claim 
that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy. As recently set forth by 
commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites, given the millions 
of users, “[i]n this environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable 
expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful 
thinking.”  
 
Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 657 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (citation omitted). 
382 Deborah Radcliff, A Cry for Privacy: As E-Commerce Grows, Businesses Must 
Avoid Intruding on the Lives of Customers — Or Risk Losing Them, COMPUTERWORLD, 
May 17, 1999, at 46. 
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Under First Amendment pressure, it becomes easy to think a plaintiff simply 
needs to “toughen up” or have “thicker skin.”383 Thinking this way can 
inappropriately diminish appreciation for the seriousness of the injury.384 As 
observed by Justice Stewart, “[t]he right of a [person] to the protection of his own 
reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our 
basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being.”385 Nor is 
this some transitory right of recent vintage: 
 
There is no doubt about the historical fact that the interest in one’s good 
name was considered an important interest requiring legal protection 
more than a thousand years ago; and that so far as Anglo-Saxon history 
is concerned this interest became a legally protected interest 
comparatively soon after the interest in bodily integrity was given legal 
protection.386 
 
Though there are variances in legal schemes for addressing injury from 
defamation, there is a cross-cultural recognition of the injury and need for 
redress.387 As Professor Anita Bernstein observed, “[m]any belief systems and 
ideologies that otherwise clash with one another—religious doctrines, secular 
humanism, and psychological, philosophical, sociological, and anthropological 
understandings—unite around dignity as central to human life in a society. Dignity 
encompasses reputation, the center of defamation.”388 Simply stated, “publication 
of untruths about people can hurt those people, often quite severely.”389 Tort 
damages arising from defamation include compensation for out-of-pocket financial 
losses incurred by the plaintiff, harm suffered to plaintiff’s reputation and standing 
in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish.390 Redress of 
defamation injuries is in accord with traditional and broadly accepted principles 
undergirding tort law.391 
383 See, e.g., Shulman v. Hunderfund, 905 N.E.2d 1159, 1163 (N.Y. 2009) (noting the 
need for a public figure defamation plaintiff “to develop a thicker skin”).  
384 See Amy Kristin Sanders & Natalie Christine Olsen, Re-Defining Defamation: 
Psychological Sense of Community in the Age of the Internet, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 355, 
363 (2012). 
385 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966). 
386 LAURENCE H. ELDRIDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 53, at 293–94 (1978). 
387 See DIANE ROWLAND & ELIZABETH MACDONALD, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
LAW 393–94 (3d ed. 2005). 
388 Anita Bernstein, Real Remedies for Virtual Injuries, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1457, 1462 
(2012). 
389 Schauer, supra note 138, at 912. 
390 Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of 
Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569, 584 (2001).  
391 Stanley Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between Reason and Decency, 65 VA. L. 
REV. 785, 791–92 (1979). 
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Injury prevention by restraining speakers who make statements that may 
injure the reputation of others also stands as one of the core purposes of 
defamation actions.392 The purpose of the actual malice standard is to loosen 
restraints to allow for a robust flow of debate and discussion. Loosening restraints 
is not, however, always a good thing for the individual or the broader society. 
“[U]nfortunately for those defamed, you cannot unring a bell.”393 Where injury has 
been done to a person’s reputation, the person cannot be returned to the same place 
of good standing within the community.394 The internet only magnifies the 
problem by bringing into effect a propagandist’s vision of telling a lie enough 
times to make it indelibly fixed as the truth.395 Even professional service 
companies, like Reputation.com, discussed above, have limits on their capacity for 
removing harmful untruthful information from the internet,396 and accessing the 
services of these companies is “expensive and beyond the means of many 
victims.”397 
Furthermore, lesser restraint through the application of the actual malice 
standard threatens to lead to increased media errors, which reduce public 
confidence and injure the media’s role as a watchdog.398 The proliferation of 
untrue statements, which is generally deemed low-value speech,399 not only floods 
392 Id. at 792. 
393 Salil K. Mehra, Post a Message and Go to Jail: Criminalizing Internet Libel in 
Japan and the United States, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 801 (2007). 
394 See, e.g., Connor v. Scroggs, 821 So. 2d 542, 552 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that 
“[a]ccusing a person of [sexual molestation of a child] without cause is equally horrendous 
[as the actual crime] in light of the public humiliation such an allegation would cause the 
accused person”); Blatnik v. Avery Dennison Corp., 774 N.E.2d 282, 293 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2002) (upholding a defamation jury award because “[a] man’s reputation is ruined when he 
is publicly labeled as one who cannot be trusted around women in the workplace”). 
395 See generally THOMAS PRESTON, PANDORA’S TRAP: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION 
MAKING AND BLAME AVOIDANCE IN VIETNAM AND IRAQ 84 (2011) (describing the 
political tactic of “staying on message and repeating a charge (regardless of the evidence) 
[as] an age old tactic” that when “[r]epeated enough times . . . becomes engrained in the 
public mind, easily recalled and difficult to remove”). 
396 See Michael L. Rustad, Twenty-First-Century Tort Theories: The Internalist/ 
Externalist Debate, 88 IND. L.J. 419, 430 (2013) (“Even with the help of companies . . . 
that will attempt to expunge tortious postings, you cannot really ‘unring the bell’ once 
information is posted, copied, and forwarded around the globe.”). 
397 Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 105 (2009). 
398 See ROY L. MOORE & MICHAEL D. MURRAY, MEDIA LAW AND ETHICS 112–19 (3d 
ed. 2008) (describing the media’s important role as a “watchdog” in society, government, 
and democracy); WYNFORD HICKS, WRITING FOR JOURNALISTS 14 (1999); Joseph Jerome, 
Media Behavior Erodes Public Confidence, Undermines Press Clause Purpose, AM. 
CONST. SOC’Y BLOG (July 26, 2012), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/media-behavior-erode 
s-public-confidence-undermines-press-clause-purpose, archived at http://perma.cc/6D2K-
DKA3. 
399 See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 271 
(2004) (observing that “false statements of fact are not the sort of expression the First 
Amendment was meant to promote”). 
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the marketplace of ideas with inaccurate information but also undermines public 
confidence in ascertaining truth.400 Journalist Farhad Manjoo has addressed this 
latter point in an intriguing book that explores the extraordinary divide over facts, 
not policy, that have become broken down as a point of consensus and are simply 
treated as another perspective or rejected as untrue, despite their validity.401  
Additionally, while ordinary people are now empowered to communicate with 
mass audiences in a manner that would have been inconceivable for members of 
the Gertz Court four decades ago, there remains a divide between the “private 
individual” and the “public figure” in the extent of their access to audiences.402 
Simply stated, “traditional political, economic, cultural, and media elites are also 
using—and in many ways still dominating—the Internet.”403 While the 
communication reach of private individuals has increased extraordinarily, there are 
serious questions about the breadth of the audience an ordinary person can 
reach.404 As David Lat and Zach Shemtob have asserted, “even in the digital age, 
famous celebrities still have greater access to communication channels than 
ordinary citizens.”405 Accordingly, a substantial divide remains between the extent 
to which private individuals and public figures can effectively rely on self-help to 
remedy injuries to their reputations.  
Also, the Gertz assumption of the risk voluntariness rationale has lingering 
resonance. Professor Susan Gilles has drawn a set of intriguing comparisons 
between the Gertz Court’s voluntariness analysis and traditional tort law concepts 
of primary and secondary assumption of the risk. Primary assumption of the risk, 
as distinct from secondary assumption of the risk, “does not require proof of either 
subjective knowledge and appreciation of the risk by the plaintiff or actual consent 
400 See Karl S. Coplan, Climate Change, Political Truth, and the Marketplace of 
Ideas, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 545, 545–46, 550, 559. See generally CATECHISM OF THE 
CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2486 (2d ed. 2011) (“Lying is destructive of society; it undermines 
trust among men and tears apart the fabric of social relationships.”). 
401 See generally FARHAD MANJOO, TRUE ENOUGH: LEARNING TO LIVE IN A POST-
FACT SOCIETY 1–2, 19–23 (2008) (discussing the complexities that underlie the 
counterintuitive paradox that for many people, facts matter less in the digital age). 
402 See generally MATTHEW HINDMAN, THE MYTH OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY 38–40, 
54–57 (2009) (noting that “communities of Web sites on different political topics are each 
dominated by a small set of highly successful sites,” which limits the public’s access to 
information). 
403 ANDREA L. PRESS &  BRUCE A. WILLIAMS, THE NEW MEDIA ENVIRONMENT: AN 
INTRODUCTION 21 (2010). 
404 See generally HINDMAN, supra note 402, at 54–57 (highlighting that “blogs almost 
immediately replicated the winners-take-all distribution of links and traffic that we see in 
the Web as a whole”). 
405 Lat & Shemtob, supra note 299, at 411; Patrick H. Hunt, Comment, Tortious 
Tweets: A Practical Guide to Applying Traditional Defamation Law to Twibel Claims, 73 
LA. L. REV. 559, 582 (2013) (“To say that all Twitter users do not have an equal voice on 
the website is an understatement. . . . An average user would likely be hard-pressed to 
effectively rebut a defamatory statement posted by a user with a larger than average 
number of followers.” (citation omitted)). 
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to that risk; merely engaging in the activity is sufficient to trigger assumption.”406 
With regard to primary assumption of the risk, even in the absence of 
individualized knowledge of the risk, persons engaging in certain activities accept 
certain risks, such as a spectator or ticketholder being hit by a foul ball at a 
baseball game.407 Alternatively, secondary assumption of the risk is focused upon 
the individual’s knowledge of and voluntary agreement to submit to the risk.408 For 
example, a person accepting a ride from a driver the person knows to be heavily 
intoxicated.409  
Insofar as voluntariness intersects with the primary assumption of the risk 
category, “[t]he Supreme Court seems to suggest that just as baseball has inherent 
dangers [that should be] apparent to all, so does public life. Those who seek a role 
of prominence in society can be deemed to agree to the inherent risks of that 
‘sport,’ the danger of false reports.”410 As for the secondary assumption of the risk 
category, Professor Gilles contends that the Court’s understanding of limited-
purpose public figure that places herself in the vortex of a public controversy 
draws a close, though not exact fit, with a subjectively knowledgeable plaintiff 
who embraces a known risk.411 The private individual, however, has neither taken 
a position that is inherently subject to media attention (primary assumption of the 
risk) nor entered into a particular controversy knowing the specific attendant 
dangers of attention (secondary assumption of the risk). To the contrary, under 
neither formulation has a private individual assumed the risk. Instead she is having 
the imposition thrust upon her. Similarly, Professor Smolla has observed that 
“[t]he public figure doctrine is heavily grounded in cultural and moral equity—if 
you can’t stand the heat of the fire, stay out of the kitchen.”412 The private 
individual neither intended to go into the kitchen nor knew that she was even there.  
 
V.  THE LOST INVOLUNTARY PUBLIC FIGURE 
 
While a number of commentators have argued for a restoration of Justice 
Brennan’s Rosenbloom plurality test as the proper constitutional rubric for 
defamation cases,413 there are compromises short of that approach that can strike a 
406 Gilles, supra note 1, at 236. 
407 Id. 
408 Id. at 235. 
409 Id. 
410 Id. at 247. 
411 Id. at 260–62. 
412 SMOLLA, supra note 213, § 6:40, at 6-370. 
413 Strong arguments have been offered in support of this position. See, e.g., Peter J. 
Hageman, Rosenbloom: Its Time Has Come Again, 17 COMM. L. 9, 9–13 (1999); Lat & 
Shemtob, supra note 299, at 404; Douglas B. McKechnie, The Death of the Public Figure 
Doctrine: How the Internet and the Westboro Baptist Church Spawned a Killer, 64 
HASTINGS L.J. 469, 490–97 (2013); Howard M. Wasserman, Two Degrees of Speech 
Protection: Free Speech Through the Prism of Agricultural Disparagement Laws, 8 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 323, 349 (2000). 
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more equitable balance between the enduring purposes served by Gertz and the 
First Amendment pressures that are pushing on the Gertz classification structure. A 
significant component of properly accommodating these competing pressures is 
found by clarifying the mysterious involuntary pubic figure category. To define 
this category, it is useful to draw upon principles from an opinion in Rosenbloom, 
though one considerably less heralded than Justice Brennan’s opinion: Justice 
White’s concurrence.  
Justice White offered a narrower expansion of constitutional constraints on 
defamation actions than the plurality in Rosenbloom. Addressing WIP Radio’s 
coverage of Philadelphia pornography distributor George Rosenbloom and his 
interactions with law enforcement, Justice White advanced the following 
understanding of why the media coverage should be protected by the actual malice 
standard: 
 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan itself made clear that discussion of the 
official actions of public servants such as the police is constitutionally 
privileged. “The right of free public discussion of the stewardship of 
public officials” is, in the language of that case, “a fundamental principle 
of the American form of government.” Discussion of the conduct of 
public officials cannot, however, be subjected to artificial limitations 
designed to protect others involved in an episode with officials from 
unfavorable publicity. Such limitations would deprive the public of full 
information about the official action that took place. In the present case, 
for example, the public would learn nothing if publication only of the 
fact that the police made an arrest were permitted; it is also necessary 
that the grounds for the arrest and, in many circumstances, the identity of 
the person arrested be stated. In short, it is rarely informative for 
newspapers or broadcasters to state merely that officials acted unless 
they also state the reasons for their action and the persons whom their 
action affected. 
Nor can New York Times be read as permitting publications that 
invade the privacy or injure the reputations of officials, but forbidding 
those that invade the privacy or injure the reputations of private citizens 
against whom official action is directed. New York Times gives the 
broadcasting media and the press the right not only to censure and 
criticize officials but also to praise them and the concomitant right to 
censure and criticize their adversaries. To extend constitutional 
protection to criticism only of officials would be to authorize precisely 
that sort of thought control that the First Amendment forbids government 
to exercise. 
I would accordingly hold that in defamation actions, absent actual 
malice as defined in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the First 
Amendment gives the press and the broadcast media a privilege to report 
and comment upon the official actions of public servants in full detail, 
with no requirement that the reputation or the privacy of an individual 
2014] LOST INVOLUNTARY PUBLIC FIGURE 1007 
involved in or affected by the official action be spared from public 
view.414  
 
Professors David Anderson and Laurence Tribe argue the Gertz Court’s 
cryptic discussion of involuntary public figures is intended to encapsulate those 
individuals qualifying under the rubric set forth in Justice White’s concurring 
opinion in Rosenbloom.415 Professor Anderson concluded that Gertz’s involuntary 
public figure “is not much broader than the one suggested by Justice White in his 
concurring opinion in Rosenbloom: ‘individual[s] involved in or affected by . . . 
official action.’”416 Similarly, Professor Tribe has observed that the involuntary 
public figure category “appears to include persons who are involved in or directly 
affected by the actions of public officials.”417 Professor Tribe argued that 
accordingly “the magazine distributor in the Rosenbloom case arrested by the 
police for distributing obscene literature would be an involuntary public figure 
with respect to reports or comments about the arrest.”418 Not only does Justice 
White’s concurrence present a viable contender for bringing meaning to the Gertz 
Court’s fleeting and cryptic reference to involuntary public figures, it also provides 
a useful cornerstone for constructing this category in light of four decades of post-
Gertz societal and jurisprudential evolution. 
Drawing on Justice White’s concurrence and considering the issue from a 
normative perspective, courts should distinguish an involuntary public figure from 
a private individual using the following rubric. An otherwise private individual 
will be treated as an involuntary public figure to the extent that the individual is 
integrally intertwined with addressing the following: 
 
(1) the official conduct or qualifications for office of a public official,  
(2) the actions of a public figure with regard to a matter of public 
concern, or 
(3) a matter of public concern itself.  
 
The Merriam-Webster’s definition of integral—“important and necessary” or 
“essential to completeness”419—is incorporated herein.  
As for the first species of involuntary public figures—those who are integrally 
intertwined with addressing the official conduct or qualifications for office of a 
public official—Justice White quite properly observed that “[d]iscussion of the 
414 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 61–62 (1971) (White, J., 
concurring) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964)). 
415 TRIBE, supra note 236, at 880; David A. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-
Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422, 450–451 (1975). 
416 Anderson, supra note 415, at 451 (quoting Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 62 (White, J., 
concurring)). 
417 TRIBE, supra note 236, at 880. 
418 Id. (citation omitted). 
419 Integral, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/integr 
al, archived at http://perma.cc/F6A2-UGTM (last visited Aug. 18, 2014). 
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conduct of public officials cannot . . . be subjected to artificial limitations designed 
to protect others involved in an episode with officials from unfavorable publicity. 
Such limitations would deprive the public of full information about the official 
action that took place.”420 A contrary resolution would undermine the fundamental 
animating principle that launched the Supreme Court’s recognition of 
constitutional limitations upon defamation actions in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan. At its core, the New York Times decision serves to protect the ability of 
the people and press to discuss the actions of public officials so as to engage in 
self-governance. The entwinement of a private person in the official conduct of a 
public official cannot function as a shield for reports about the conduct of a public 
official.421 Because enabling democratic self-governance stands as the core 
420 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 61 (1971) (White, J., concurring). 
421 A Tennessee Court of Appeals decision in Lewis v. NewsChannel 5 Network, L.P., 
238 S.W.3d 270 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007), is illustrative of this approach: 
 
The undisputed facts in this case establish as a matter of law that Brad 
Lewis should be deemed to be a public figure for the purpose of NewsChannel 
5’s report regarding Major Dollarhide’s official misconduct. He is, to be sure, an 
involuntary public figure because he did not purposely inject himself into the 
forefront of the controversy surrounding Major Dollarhide. However, the 
NewsChannel 5 defendants had the right to report on Major Dollarhide’s 
disempowerment and on the reasons why the Chief of Police decided to relieve 
him of his duties. This right necessarily included reporting on the circumstances 
surrounding Major Dollarhide’s intervention to prevent Brad Lewis from being 
arrested on December 27, 1998. Without these facts, the public would not have 
been fully and appropriately informed of the seriousness of Major Dollarhide’s 
misconduct. 
Had the facts that Brad Lewis believes to be libelous been removed from 
the NewsChannel 5 story, the public would have been left to speculate about the 
reasons for the Chief of Police’s actions. The public would only have been 
informed that Major Dollarhide had gone to the scene of an incident where a 
person was being detained and that he had secured the release of that individual. 
Based on this information alone, the public would have no way of assessing 
what Major Dollarhide’s motivation had been or whether Major Dollarhide was 
being disempowered for an adequate or inadequate reason. Even if the public 
had assumed that Major Dollarhide had acted improperly in some way, it would 
have no way of ascertaining how serious his misconduct was. 
The fact that Brad Lewis was the person involved in the incident that led to 
Major Dollarhide’s disempowerment sheds significant light on Major 
Dollarhide’s conduct. The fact that Brad Lewis allegedly had firearms, betting 
slips, and a large amount of cash in his possession when he was detained 
dramatically emphasizes the seriousness of Major Dollarhide’s misconduct. 
These facts removed ambiguity from the story. They informed the public that 
Major Dollarhide had intervened to prevent a family member from being 
arrested for serious criminal offenses. By reporting these facts, the 
NewsChannel 5 defendants enabled the public to better understand Major 
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purpose for protecting freedom of speech, the weight on Gertz’s balancing between 
the state’s interests in protecting a private individual against injury from 
defamation and the need of a robust and vigorous press are most pronounced in 
favor of application of the actual malice standard with regard to the species of 
involuntary public figures who have become intertwined with public officials. 
Involuntary public figures are not, however, limited to this variety. 
First Amendment purposes extending beyond self-governance point toward 
recognition of a second species of involuntary public figures, those who are 
integrally intertwined with addressing the actions of a public figure regarding a 
matter of public concern. The entwinement of a private person with a public figure 
on a matter of public concern cannot function as a shield for reports about a public 
figure as to matters of public concern any more than it can as to a public official.422 
As a practical matter, litigation in such cases appears to regularly involve closely 
related family members or those involved in romantic relationships with all-
purpose public figures.423 There is, however, conceptually no reason to limit this 
species of involuntary public figure to family members of or those involved in 
romantic relationships with all-purpose public figures. While strong arguments can 
be made for distinguishing public officials from public figures,424 the important 
First Amendment purposes served beyond the political sphere point toward 
embracing this application. Failure to apply the actual malice standard in cases 
wherein private individuals are integrally intertwined with addressing the actions 
of a public figure regarding a matter of public concern would inhibit the press in 
reporting on the actions of public figures with regard to matters of public concern. 
The First Amendment importance of reporting the matter is not diminished by the 
entwinement of the private person with the public figure and, as reflected in the 
discussion above, the rationale for dividing private persons from public figures has 
been diminished. Accordingly, the scale tips, though the question is a closer one 
Dollarhide’s corrupt motivation, as well as the seriousness of his breach of his 
official duty. 
 
Id. at 299–300. 
422 The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238 
(5th Cir. 1980), is illustrative of this approach. Therein, Anita Brewer, who was at one time 
Elvis Presley’s “number one girlfriend,” and her husband, Joe Brewer, were referenced in 
media reports about Elvis Presley following the dissolution of his marriage to Priscilla 
Presley. Id. at 1257–58. The references involved Brewer’s earlier relationship with Elvis. 
Id. The Court concluded that Brewer had actually become a limited-purpose public figure 
for purposes of her connection with Elvis and that neither she nor her husband would be 
treated as private individuals. Id. 
423 See generally Mark P. Strasser, A Family Affair? Domestic Relations and 
Involuntary Public Figure Status, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 69, 100 (2013) (noting that 
“[s]everal cases suggest that family status alone may be enough to make one an involuntary 
public figure”). 
424 See generally Schauer, supra note 138, at 905–35 (arguing important differences 
exist between public officials and public figures that warrant applying a higher level of 
constitutional protection to speech regarding public officials than public figures). 
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than with public officials, in favor of application of the actual malice standard in 
cases involving otherwise private individuals who are integrally intertwined with 
addressing the actions of a public figure regarding a matter of public concern.  
The third species of involuntary public figures, those integrally intertwined 
with addressing a matter of public concern itself, is the application in which there 
is the greatest susceptibility of the Gertz structure collapsing and an implicit 
restoration of the Rosenbloom test occurring. However, that result need not follow, 
and in fact an appropriate recognition of this variety of involuntary public figure 
will reduce First Amendment pressures upon courts to define voluntariness in a 
questionable manner. In other words, instead of expanding the definition of 
voluntariness until it becomes almost unrecognizable, courts can instead return 
voluntariness to a more reasonable interpretation of the concept while developing 
the involuntary public figure category. 
Three cases are particularly helpful in illustrating this species of involuntary 
public figure: (1) Wiegel v. Capital Times Co.,425 (2) Dameron v. Washington 
Magazine, Inc.,426 and (3) Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell.427 In Wiegel, the 
plaintiff, Joseph Wiegel, declined to exercise soil-erosion-prevention measures that 
had been recommended but not required by government officials, resulting in more 
than $100,000 in cleanup costs for taxpayers to rehabilitate waterways bordering 
his farm.428 A local newspaper, The Capital Times, covered Wiegel’s disinclination 
to put into place a soil erosion plan and the adverse consequences thereof.429 The 
Capital Times advocated for increased restrictions to be imposed upon Wiegel to 
prevent this continuing injury to the public coffers and the environment.430  
The plaintiff in Dameron, Merle Dameron, worked as an air traffic controller 
and had been the only air traffic controller on duty when a plane crashed coming 
into Dulles Airport in 1974.431 Following a plane crash at Dulles in 1982, the 
Washingtonian magazine ran a story about the accident and addressed airline 
safety issues, especially those related to Dulles.432 Relying upon a National 
Transportation Safety Board report, the author of the story observed that 
significant strides had been made in improving airline safety including air traffic 
control improvements, but that more should be done, noting three accidents that 
were partly attributable to air traffic controllers.433 The author did not list the 
controllers by name but did list the three accidents.434  
The last case, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, involved Centennial Olympic 
Park security guard Richard Jewell and media reports regarding the Federal Bureau 
425 426 N.W.2d 43 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988). 
426 779 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
427 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). 
428 Wiegel, 426 N.W.2d at 45. 
429 Id. 
430 Id. 
431 Dameron, 779 F.2d at 737–38. 
432 Id. 
433 Id. at 738. 
434 Id. 
                                                          
2014] LOST INVOLUNTARY PUBLIC FIGURE 1011 
of Investigation’s turning the focus of its investigation to Jewell as a suspected 
bomber in an act of domestic terrorism perpetrated at the 1996 Atlanta 
Olympics.435 In each of these cases, a private individual was integrally intertwined 
with addressing a matter of public concern.  
Caution in application of this category is, however, warranted. Courts should 
not apply the involuntary public figure designation where the private individual’s 
involvement in the matter of public concern was only tangential or trivial436 or 
where the private individual is simply someone who is “illustrative of some 
perceived social ill.”437 Under such circumstances, the would-be involuntary public 
figure is not integral to addressing a matter of public concern. Instead, private 
individuals remain primarily undifferentiated from other private individuals, and 
the matter can be addressed meaningfully without their inclusion. Exclusion of 
reference to such persons is an inconvenience rather than a disabling limitation on 
the media in addressing a matter of public concern where the private individual is 
merely tangential, trivial, or simply being used in a representative capacity. That 
inconvenience does not override the continuing value served by the Gertz 
framework.  
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Professor John C. P. Goldberg astutely observed that New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan “was about as easy to resolve as a landmark decision could be. But easy 
cases are not easy in all respects. Precisely because their outcomes are 
overdetermined, they pose the problem of how to decide subsequent cases, in 
which all signs are not pointing toward one resolution.”438 L. B. Sullivan and the 
Alabama political establishment’s aggressive use of defamation law as a tool to 
support the maintenance of white supremacy by striking at political adversaries in 
the press and the civil rights movement brought to the surface the dangers posed by 
defamation suits to democratic self-governance. It was, despite the dramatic 
change in the centuries of precedent, as noted by Professor Goldberg, an easy case. 
The Court in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts extended constitutional safeguards to 
speech addressing public figures, which the Court conceived of in political terms. 
In doing so though, the Supreme Court opened a door that state and lower-federal 
courts walked through to employ the constitutional safeguards of the actual malice 
standard to serve First Amendment purposes beyond the sphere of debate and 
discussion regarding public policy. The Court, however, went too far in 
Rosenbloom, not on the facts of the case but in terms of the legal standard adopted 
by the plurality. The balance between safeguarding the press and safeguarding an 
435 Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175, 178, 182 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2001). 
436 See, e.g., Hopkins, supra note 217, at 32 (stating that “[i]f [the plaintiff’s] role is 
tangential or trivial, the plaintiff is often held to be a private person”). 
437 Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 485 (Minn. 1985). 
438 John C. P. Goldberg, Judging Reputation: Realism and Common Law in Justice 
White’s Defamation Jurisprudence, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1471, 1478 (2003). 
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injured private individual had become overly protective of the media and 
insufficiently so of private individuals. The Gertz decision was a response to these 
excesses of Rosenbloom. Gertz would prove, at least in the high court’s application 
and understanding of its standards, to be an overcorrection.  
Four decades of jurisprudential and societal change have brought enormous 
pressure to bear on the Gertz framework. That pressure is being released in a 
number of ways including a dramatically expanded notion of what constitutes 
voluntariness. The structure itself is potentially in danger of collapse. That is 
problematic insofar as there are important values that are served by Gertz in 
safeguarding private individuals against the substantial harm that can be caused by 
defamation.  
The involuntary public figure category provides a release valve for some of 
the pressures that have built up. Justice White perceived the Rosenbloom plurality 
as over-reaching. Instead of the plurality’s giant leap, he offered in his concurrence 
a more modest step forward. A workable framework for constructing an 
involuntary public figure can be reestablished on the more modest step forward 
identified by Justice White with some alterations to reflect jurisprudential and 
societal changes. By finding the lost involuntary public figure, courts take a small 
step forward to restoring doctrinal clarity with less danger of again swinging the 
pendulum too far. 
